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ACCIDENTS AND AGGREGATES
Lee Anne Fennell*
Tort law deals in lumps. It responds not to the innumerable fine-grained
acts of risk creation that each of us performs every day but rather to large,
discrete, harmful events—“accidents.” And it responds to those events in a
binary way, converting unruly facts into an on/off judgment about liability.1
The fact that tort law operates at the accident level rather than at the level of
risk creation presents some complications, at least if we understand tort
liability as significantly directed at providing appropriate incentives for
action.2 The accident, on this view, serves as a window into risk-creating
(and risk-abating) behavior, and liability represents a rough-and-ready way
of addressing that behavior—a kind of accounting shortcut that focuses on a
realization event. How then should law isolate and evaluate the sample of
risk-related behavior connected to the accident?
This paper provides fresh traction on this foundational question by
examining the underappreciated role of evaluative aggregation in the
liability determination. I focus on three aggregative choices: (1) how much
behavior to compile for purposes of assessing due care; (2) how to stack
together units of precaution in examining a defendant’s shortfall; and (3)
how to factor the actual or imagined repetition of an interaction into liability
judgments.3 These aggregative choices carry decisive weight by
determining how large a slice of an injurer’s conduct tort law will capture
within its viewfinder, and how tight the causal connection must be between
*
Max Pam Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, I
thank Matthew Adler, Nuno Garoupa, Mark Grady, Daniel Hemel, Bert Huang, Gregory Keating, Saul Levmore,
Gary Lucas, Milan Markovic, Richard McAdams, Ariel Porat, Daria Roithmayr, David Rosenberg, Steven
Shavell, Thomas Ulen, and participants in workshops at Texas A&M School of Law, the University of Chicago
Law School, and at the 2017 American Law and Economics Association annual meeting. Research support from
the Harold J. Green Faculty Fund and the SNR Denton Fund is also gratefully acknowledged. Earlier drafts of this
paper were circulated under the title Lumps and Lapses in Tort Law.
1
In this respect, tort law is not unique—law often has an all-or-nothing quality. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, WHY
THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 139-56 (2011) (examining the either/or nature of law); Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and
Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014) (analyzing the law’s choice between continuous and discontinuous
outcomes).
2
Tort law also serves other functions such as compensation and loss-spreading, and can be analyzed through
corrective justice and civil recourse frames that make the accident dominant for independent reasons. The
deterrence function of tort law will be my focus in this paper, while recognizing that it may exist in some tension
with other approaches and goals.
3
Scholars have previously considered a variety of other aggregation puzzles in tort and other law, including
how to aggregate different elements of a cause of action. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and
Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2 (2012); Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001); see
also Porat & Posner, supra, at 10 n.8 (collecting sources touching on aggregation issues).
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the shortfalls observed there and the accident at hand.
Consider, for example, a point emphasized in work on “lapses”4 or
“compliance errors”5: It is impossible for human beings to be perfectly
consistent in undertaking precautions that must be repeated over and over in
real time, such as alertly scanning the road while driving.6 A single moment
of inattention that produces an accident might be part of a larger pattern that
represents as much care as any person could reasonably be expected to
exercise.7 Of course, the accident-causing shortfall might instead be a
representative draw from an urn of chronically unreasonable conduct. Tort
law does not distinguish between these cases because it takes as the relevant
unit of analysis the single accident-causing moment, not a larger behavioral
sample that might provide corroborating or mitigating evidence about the
actor’s overall level of care.8 This does not necessarily mean that tort law
should look at broader behavioral patterns—indeed, there are reasons to
question that prescription—but it does mean that the choice to focus on a
single moment in assessing negligence carries consequences.
The consequences mount when we consider the possibility that certain
durable technologies or mechanical processes might either substitute for or
complement fast-eroding human precautions like paying attention while
driving.9 The emergence of autonomous vehicles represents an especially
salient current example. A machine with a known error rate will seem to
naturally invite an aggregate analysis, with attention focusing on whether
the overall pattern of outcomes could have been cost-effectively improved.
If not, then using the machine may appear nonnegligent, even though the
machine might hiccup now and then and cause an accident, just as a
generally cautious human might lapse. If the two cases are treated
differently, certain technologies might be overused or underused depending
on the degree to which their deployment demands sustained human
attention.10 It is possible to address this problem without widening tort
law’s behavioral viewfinder, but doing so requires recognizing the unsung
4
See generally Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road
Accidents, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 329 (2014).
5
See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 887 (1994).
6
See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
7
For this reason, some of what the law considers negligence may on a broader interpretation not really
constitute negligence at all—at least not in the sense of representing an inefficient failure of due care. See
generally Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEO. L.J. 397 (1998).
8
Of course, juries may try to distinguish the cases through back-channel ways based on inferences that they
draw about the defendant’s character. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
9
Cooter and Porat focus on the possibility that liability for lapses could lead to substitution of approaches
and technologies that are less safe overall. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 4, at 350-55. Mark Grady instead
emphasizes complementarity between durable and nondurable precautionary technologies, with advances in the
former generating increased potential for compliance errors relating to the latter. See Grady, supra note 5, at 90809, 933-35; Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical
Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 293, 330-31 (1988). See also Cooter & Porat, supra note 4, at 353
n.54 (noting this divergence between their work and Grady’s).
10
See Part I.B, infra.
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role of aggregation choices in shaping liability, and hence incentives.
Another margin for evaluative aggregation in tort law involves stacking
together or breaking apart a set of precautionary steps that the actor in
question chose to forego. Suppose, for example, a cricket ball sails out of
an unfenced cricket field at an altitude of seven feet ten inches and brains a
pedestrian.11 At trial, the pedestrian’s estate shows that putting up an eightfoot fence—one high enough to have prevented this accident—would have
cost only $1000 but would have saved an expected $1200 in accident costs
over the useful life of the fence. This might look like an open and shut win
for the plaintiff, at least if the jurisdiction follows the cost-benefit approach
to negligence famously captured in the Hand Formula.12
But not so fast. There is nothing inevitable about treating the full eight
feet of fencing as an indivisible unit when analyzing the cricket club’s
behavior. Once we disaggregate that single lumpy all-or-nothing choice into
incremental choices about fence heights, the simple case starts to look less
airtight. Suppose the first six feet of fence height are really worthwhile,
delivering $1100 in accident savings while costing only $800 in lumber and
labor, but the last two feet require an extra $200 in construction costs only
to save a marginal $100 in accident costs.13 Even though it was negligent
for the cricket club not to build a six foot fence, it would not have been
negligent for it to stop at six feet—and a six foot fence would not have
stopped the fateful ball. On this account, the club’s negligence (its failure to
build the optimal six foot fence) did not cause the accident. The correct
doctrinal result would seem to be no liability.14
Yet again, not so fast. We still must consider how these aggregation
decisions interact with an important architectural feature of tort law—the
fact that liability falls to zero at the point of due care under a negligence
standard. One implication of that architecture has been well recognized: the
possibility that a defendant would face a behavior-distorting cliff of liability
if held to account not only for the harm that occurs because he is negligent
but also for all of “the harm that occurs when he is negligent.”15 But there is
11
This is a standard example, prompted by the facts of Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850, 1 All. E.R. 1078
(H.L.) rev’g [1950] 1 K.B. 201. See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND
QUESTIONS 147-48 (2d ed. 2009); Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence
Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 428-29 (1989).
12
The Hand Formula was famously articulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing,
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1047). The formula calls for comparing the burden (B) of an untaken precaution (such as
the unbuilt fence) against the expected probability of injury (P) multiplied by the expected magnitude of loss (L).
If B is less than P times L, it is negligent not to undertake the precaution. See id. at 173.
13
See FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 11, at 146-47 (providing similar variations on the fence
problem); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 175 (11th
ed. 2016) (presenting similar hypotheticals that demonstrate the problem of “choosing the correct interval for
assessing defendant’s conduct”);
14
See Kahan, supra note 11, at 429 (“[A]s a matter of common law, an injurer is only liable for accidents
caused by his negligence. Therefore, the owner would not be liable for injuries from balls flying over the fence at
heights exceeding [the efficient height]”).
15
ROBERT D. COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT 26 (2014); see also id. at 17-31; Mark.
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another implication of the negligence regime that has been widely ignored,
though it also bears on whether the cricket club should be let off the hook.
The law plunks a flat ledge of zero liability across the entire range of
conduct falling beyond due care—a range of conduct that, in fact, generates
different real-world accident rates.16 This ledge also has distortive effects,
ones that will ultimately require us to reverse our earlier intuition about
whether to analytically disaggregate the unbuilt cricket fence.17 The
precaution aggregation choice turns out to be a crucial lever for optimally
adjusting the required causal relationship between negligence and harm.
Finally, tort law contains some important puzzles that only become
visible when a particular interaction is repeated many times (whether as a
matter of fact, or as a conceptual exercise). Deciding whether and how to
“scale up” the liability analysis constitutes another domain for implicit
aggregation choices. Repetition can reveal distortions and injustices that are
muted at the individual-accident level—or it can do the opposite, washing
out apparent anomalies.18 Because statistical risks and expected payoffs
become more meaningful and tractable under large-number conditions,
results that appear intolerable at close range—a large chunk of liability for a
relatively trivial act of negligence, say—may look more acceptable once we
zoom out to capture a larger set of similar interactions.19 Here, it becomes
important to consider whether insurance or specialized doctrines can
synthetically replicate large-number conditions for individuals.
Repetition may instead compound rather than counterbalance systemic
shortfalls in liability patterns, however. Consider the negligence of doctors
in subspecialties where patients routinely have high background risks of
death. A doctor who negligently treats a population of patients who are
overwhelmingly likely to die in any event will always be let off the hook by
F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 804 (1983) (referring to these two
possibilities as “the P*-cutoff rule” and “the full liability rule,” respectively); Richard W. Wright, The New Old
Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability, 7 J. TORT L. 65, 84 (2014) (referring to the “harming because
negligent” rule as “the Optimal Care Rule”). Put in Robert Cooter’s terms, the latter possibility would impose a
discontinuous “sanction” for failing to exercise due care, not merely a “price” that taxes negligent conduct at the
margin. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
16
This might seem irrelevant, given that the range is one where, by definition, precaution costs exceed the
savings in accident costs. But it turns out to matter under real-world conditions of uncertainty, for reasons Mark
Grady previously articulated, see Grady, supra note 15 and that I revisit in depth below, see Parts II.A & B infra.
17
This conclusion follows from Grady, supra note 15, although the distortive “ledge effect”(as I call it) does
not seem to have been widely appreciated. Here, I reframe the analysis to focus on the aggregation decision and
show how it operates where decisions are chunky rather than continuous. See Part II, infra.
18
See infra Part II.A.
19
This point tracks one that is made in the economic literature—that problems of lumpiness or indivisibility
become less troublesome in high-volume contexts. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 62 (1971) (noting that “the economic significance” of indivisibilities “is relatively less
when the number of units is larger” and observing that “the difference between one stamping mill and none is
important, but if the relevant choice is between 100 and 101 shovels, the assumption of divisibility is unlikely to
be seriously misleading”); HAGEN BOBZIN, INDIVISIBILITIES: MICROECONOMIC THEORY WITH RESPECT TO
INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND FACTORS 2 (1998) (“The difference between the production of 100 000 or 100 001 cars
is of little significance for an automobile company, whereas a household faces considerable consequences
depending on whether it has got a car or not.”).
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a more-likely-than-not standard, even if her negligence caused, say, 20 out
of 100 observed deaths. Although scholars have proposed various
approaches to this well-recognized problem,20 one alternative appears to
have escaped attention: Instead of asking whether a given harm was more
likely than not caused by the doctor’s negligence, ask whether the harm was
more likely to have been caused by the doctor’s negligence than the other
harms in the conceptual set generated by repetition of the interaction.
Here, we can take a page from “thresholding” in image manipulation.21
When a grayscale image is converted into black and white, a continuous
variable (shading) must be translated, pixel by pixel, into binary results.22 A
globally applied threshold will produce unacceptable results where, for
example, light or shadow falls across a portion of the image, making all
pixels in a given region darker or lighter than the threshold that works best
elsewhere in the image.23 The key to successfully picking out foreground
from background is to see which pixels are local standouts—hence,
thresholding methods examine shapes, clusters, and pixel neighborhoods in
order to determine the appropriate local threshold.24 Translated into the tort
realm, this would suggest lowering the liability threshold in contexts with
high background risk to pick out those instances that were most likely to
have been caused by the doctor’s negligence.
All these aggregation issues become relevant precisely because tort law
reaches behavior through the narrow and hazy window of observation
afforded by the individual accident. If all instances of risk creation and
mitigation could be perfectly tracked and priced, nothing special would
transpire when one of those acts manifested in an accident, and there would
be no need to worry about how to isolate the behavior relevant to the
accident or assess any causal connections. Likewise, the lumpiness of
accidents would matter little if actors (and their insurers) could respond to
expected costs that exhibited a predictable sensitivity to changes in
behavioral inputs.25 But this is exactly the problem: accidents demand
20

See infra Part III.C.
See, e.g., ALAN C. BOVIK, HANDBOOK OF IMAGE AND VIDEO PROCESSING 39-43 (2005).
22
To the extent law’s work involves similarly rendering continuous variables into binaries, it operates as a
thresholding enterprise. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 1, at 157-81 (using the example of the law’s treatment of
death to illustrate its reliance on binary categories); Adam J. Kolber, Smoothing Vague Laws, in VAGUENESS IN
THE LAW 275, 281 (Geert Keil and Ralf Poscher, eds., 2016) (“[W]henever we use a bumpy law to govern a
smooth phenomenon, we are rounding a continuous result to some nearby discrete option.”).
23
See Robert Fisher et al., Hypermedia Image Processing Reference, Adaptive Thresholding,
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/rbf/HIPR2/adpthrsh.htm (2000) (describing and depicting the use of “local adaptive
thresholding” to address situations where “a strong illumination gradient” makes global thresholding perform
poorly).
24
See, e.g., id. (describing techniques of “adaptive thresholding” that consider the local pixel neighborhood
in setting thresholds and allow the threshold to vary over the image accordingly); BOVIK, supra note , at 43-55
(discussing use of “region correction algorithms” and related approaches to address shortcomings of
thresholding).
25
See Mark F. Grady, Book Review, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658,
659 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
21
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binary liability responses that turn on just how the accident-relevant
behavior is isolated, sliced, and analyzed—in other words, on issues of
evaluative aggregation.
Although this paper focuses on the way that aggregation issues play out
in the torts field, related issues of aggregation run through all of law.26
Property scholars wrestle with the “denominator problem” in regulatory
takings doctrine, which likewise requires determining the proper unit of
analysis against which to assess the impact of a particular governmental
action.27 Conceptually similar problems crop up in a variety of other fields,
from constitutional law28 to copyright29 to criminal law.30 Likewise, the
broad run of legislative line-drawing exercises implicitly depend on—and
can strategically manipulate—aggregation decisions.31 Thus the analysis
here, although focused on tort doctrine, connects to larger issues of
evaluative aggregation.
The paper proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the slice of behavior
used to assess negligence liability. Part II considers how the aggregation of
(untaken) precautionary steps interacts with tort’s liability structure. Part III
examines the significance of event repetition where uncertainty exists about
causation. Part IV turns to connections between these tort law aggregation
problems and related problems that arise in other doctrinal areas.
I. LUMPING LAPSES
Human beings cannot avoid occasionally falling short in their efforts to
take due care. As Tony Honoré put it, “in no activity or walk of life can
people consistently maintain the high standard of skill and care required by
law without variation.”32 Driving offers the most familiar example. Anyone
(1987)) (observing that the “abrupt” relationship between lapses and liability “does not necessarily create a
discontinuity in expected liability”).
26
I am exploring a number of these other contexts, and connections between them, in a book currently in
progress. Lee Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps: Division and Aggregation in Law and Life (under contract with
University of Chicago Press).
27
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (“Regrettably, the
rhetorical force of our ‘deprivation of all economically feasible use’ rule is greater than its precision, since the rule
does not make clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured.”); see also infra Part
IV.C.
28
Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311 (2002).
29
See Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860914.
30
Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal Responsibility for
Unspecified Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261 (2009).
31
Line-drawing sometimes occurs quite literally, as through zoning, annexation, districting, and choosing
areas for condemnation. Manipulating literal or figurative boundaries to make things come out right on net offers
strategic possibilities because it allows bundling in negative value increments along with positive value ones,
where the surplus associated with the former is sufficient to absorb the deficits associated with the latter.
32
Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530, 549-50 (1988); see also Jeffrey J.
Rachlinksi, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1055 (2003) (“[P]eople's
attention often lapses in the face of monotonous, albeit dangerous tasks. Despite tort law's requirement of
reasonableness, it is difficult to maintain focus on a repetitive task.”); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and
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who drives very often will experience the occasional lapse of attention.33
While usually harmless and quickly forgotten, these lapses sometimes
produce an alarming near-miss, and in a tragic few cases, a terrible accident.
How should these shortfalls be treated? Answering this inquiry requires
making aggregation choices, at least implicitly.
A. Lapses and Accidents
Two dueling concerns surround the treatment of momentary lapses: the
possibility that the observed lapse is an outlier, and the possibility that the
observed lapse is representative. The first possibility makes liability for
lapses unpalatable, while the second possibility makes exempting them
problematic. Both concerns are a product of tort law’s focus on accidents
rather than on risk creation as such. Because it is a matter of luck whether
any given lapse will eventuate in an accident, and most lapses do not, the
fact that a lapse happens to be causally connected to an accident already
makes it an outlier among lapses. That fact alone cannot be a reason to
exempt the actor from liability, at least if we wish to retain the accidentbased structure of tort liability.34 What we might want to know, however, is
whether the lapse is also a behavioral outlier for this actor.
Table I illustrates the possibilities by dividing actors into four categories
based on their lapse frequency and accident outcomes.
Table 1: Lapse Rates and Outcomes

Causes an Accident
Proceeds Uneventfully

Commonly Lapses

Rarely Lapses

I
III

II
IV

Tort law breaks the rows of Table 1 apart, but collapses the columns.
The requirement that risk eventuate in harm means that only the lapsers
occupying Cells I and II face potential liability. And the law’s focus on the
accident-causing moment rather than on a larger sample of the defendant’s
behavior means that Cells I and II are treated identically.35 If actors were
Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 914-15 (1997) (discussing “innocent
mistakes” that amount to negligence).
33
See, e.g., Grady, supra note 5, at 900 (“It is impossible to drive a car for any period of time without
missing a required precaution.”). As Grady explains, the problem can be characterized in terms of the
prohibitively high cost of achieving consistency in compliance. Id. at 899 (“People face a cost of consistent
performance that is greater than the sum of the cost of all individual trials.”).
34
There are alternatives of course, such as the New Zealand system for funding recoveries by accident
victims. But I assume for purposes of the discussion here that that this element of the tort framework is fixed.
35
This, at least, is the doctrinal rule. Juries may in fact “forgive” lapses that they believe to be rare. See
Mark F. Grady, Breach of Duty 15-20 (2017) (unpublished working paper, on file with author).
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instead charged based on their lapses rather than based on the accidents that
they cause, Table 1’s two rows would collapse into one, but the columns
would be broken apart for different treatment: All lapses would generate a
payment obligation, but those who rarely lapse (II and IV) would pay less
than those who commonly lapse (I and III).
Examining a larger sample of behavior when making the negligence
determination (assuming for the moment that this could be done) would also
break apart the two columns by relieving Cell II actors of liability
altogether. This would move tort law a half-measure toward a risk-based
model. Yet as long as tort law’s primary distinction between the rows
persists, liability still fails to track risk creation in the individual case, and
luck continues to govern individual outcomes. Freeing Cell II lapsers from
liability without any compensating adjustments in the other cells also means
that injurers in the aggregate will face lower expected accident costs, and
victims in the aggregate must bear more of their own losses.36
This may seem unproblematic if we suppose that the exempted
accident-causers in Cell II should never have been considered negligent in
the first place, so that the current legal approach is overcharging injurers as
a whole by sweeping in some nonnegligent parties along with the negligent
ones. But if so, why stop there? Surely some of the lapses that are
committed by the common lapsers in Cell I could have been committed by
even the most careful person—just not all of them. Yet we have no way of
telling an “excess” lapse from one that comes from a human being’s
unavoidable allotment, when assessing the cause of an accident.37 If we
tolerate liability for unavoidable lapses when they are mixed in with
avoidable ones committed by the same person, why not otherwise?
Moreover, might not charging all actors for these unavoidable lapses
make up for other shortfalls in an accident-based negligence regime? A
well-known concern about the negligence standard is that injurers will
engage in risky activities to an excessive extent because they will never bear
liability as long as they are sufficiently careful—even though their elevated
activity level raises accident costs for victims.38 This activity-level problem
assumes that injurers can always comply with the negligence standard. But
if lapses occur in proportion to activity levels, then it is impossible for an
injurer to increase her activity level without at the same time increasing her

36
Here and elsewhere in the paper, I assume that victims and injurers are disjoint sets and focus only on the
precautions available to injurers. This unilateral precaution assumption, although plainly unrealistic in many
settings, simplifies the exposition to focus attention on the puzzles of aggregation explored here,
37
Grady alludes to this problem he observes that “[m]any slips are like so many peas in a pod: the efficient
ones look the same as the uneconomic ones.” Grady, supra note 5, at 905-06.
38
See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21-26 (1987). The converse concern
attaches to a strict liability regime. Here, victims rather than injurers are likely to engage in excessive levels of
activity, even though this raises costs for injurers. Id. at 26-32.
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chance of being held liable for a lapse.39 Thus, liability for lapses could help
to check the tendency of injurers to overengage in risky activities by
effectively taxing (in expected value terms) the activity in proportion to its
volume.40
With these points in mind, we can turn to the question of whether the
individual accident-causing moment is the right or wrong unit of analysis
upon which to base liability.41 Answering this question requires considering
both whether this is a suitable or unsuitable way of linking liability to
human behavior as an absolute matter, and whether it introduces a distortive
inconsistency in the relative treatment of different categories of actors or
actions. I will start with the latter question, which has formed the basis for
critiques of the law’s treatment of lapses, before circling back to the former.
Although I conclude that inconsistent aggregation choices can indeed
produce distortions, there is more than one way to resolve differences in
relative treatment—and there is a reasonable case for doing so in a way that
retains the law’s current treatment of lapses.
B. Distorted Decisionmaking
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat have flagged the potential for the legal
treatment of human lapses to produce behavioral distortions, if the law
offers relatively more lenient treatment of other kinds of precautionary
technologies.42 The differences come down to differences in the aggregation
of behavioral samples for evaluation. Suppose, to use an example from
Ward Farnsworth and Mark Grady, that a surgeon will accidentally leave a
sponge inside a patient in one out of every one million surgeries.43 When
that one-in-a-million case occurs, the doctor will surely be found negligent
39

See Grady, supra note 9, at 309 (observing that liability for compliance errors can check activity levels).
See id. (“A rule that forgave reasonable memory lapses would be much less effective than the actual rule
in controlling activity levels.”).
41
Grady characterizes the problem of efficient lapses as one of an insufficient period of observation, but sees
practical difficulties with expanding the time scope. See, e.g., Grady, supra note 7, at 400-02. Some of the ways
that Cooter and Porat would implement a lapse defense would effectively expand the observation period, either
synthetically through probabilistic reasoning or through examining repeated lapses within a particular time frame.
See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 70-72.
42
They also observe that activity levels will be suppressed for lapse-prone activities that generate positive
externalities. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 4, at 348-50; see also Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An
Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501 (2006) (suggesting that liability may be calibrated in ways that
account for externalized benefits as well as externalized costs of behavior). This point is answered well by an
argument Steven Shavell has recently made in urging an expansion of the domain of strict liability: if activities
produce positive externalities, then actors should be subsidized in accordance with those positive externalities, not
relieved of liability for some set of accidents that they produce. See Steven Shavell, Why Strict Liability Should
Apply to All Dangerous Activities—Both Common and Uncommon 36-37 (unpublished draft, Dec. 2016) (on file
with author). It would be happenstance if relief from liability happened to match up to positive externalities, and
separating out these elements allows for better incentives to take care along dimensions that are not well-policed
by the negligence system. See id. One of those dimensions is, of course, activity levels, which liability for lapses
might help control. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
43
FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 11, at 158.
40
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for failing to undertake a simple check that would have avoided a
significant risk of loss.44 Now suppose a machine can be purchased that
keeps track of sponges used in surgery and counts them as they are
removed. If the machine malfunctions one time per million surgeries,
should its lapse be treated the same or differently from the lapse of the
surgeon?45
Cooter and Porat suggest that machine errors are likely to be treated
differently from human errors. Whereas the surgeon’s mistake will be
evaluated in isolation by asking whether it would have been cost effective
for her to spend an extra moment ensuring that she had all the sponges out
before closing up the patient (a question that will always be answered in the
affirmative) the machine’s error will be examined in terms of whether it
would be cost effective to design a machine that had a lower error rate (to
which the answer may well be negative). Although they do not put it in
quite these terms, Cooter and Porat suggest that actors may choose
mechanized precautions that will be assessed in the aggregate over
individualized human actions that will be assessed one at a time, even if the
cost-benefit ratio is better for the human precautions than for the
mechanized precautions.
The activity level issue raised above only heightens the problem that
Cooter and Porat identify. A party who cannot avoid using a technology—
human judgment—that will generate actionable lapses as she increases the
volume of a given activity may indeed curtail her activity level. But a party
who can substitute a mechanized precautionary technology that meets the
due care standard will have no such incentive.46 Rather, she can be certain
that no matter how high her activity level, the technology will always
protect her from liability because its overall low failure rate will be deemed
to meet the due care standard. Thus a driver who relies on cruise control (or,
soon, automated cars) may be able to increase the number of miles driven
without fear of expanded liability, while a driver whose own decisions
about speed or other factors will be evaluated one by one could not do so.
The distortion that concerns Cooter and Porat, then, is foundationally a
44
Id. (“[I]f a surgeon mistakenly leaves a sponge inside a patient, there is no room for him to argue that in
fact he is a very careful person and that this was a once-in-a-lifetime slipup.”).
45
See id. (asking but not answering this question).
46
A wrinkle explored at length by Grady is the potential complementarity between technological
developments and “nondurable” precautions like checking dials and instruments—the omission of which amounts
to compliance errors. See generally Grady, supra note 9. Grady hypothesizes that these complementarities are
ubiquitous and typically cause technological developments to increase rather than decrease compliance errors and
hence findings of negligence. If all technologies involved such complementarities and heightened associated risks
of lapses, then the concern about substitution raised by Cooter and Porat would not occur—if anything,
substitution away from new technologies would be seen because these technologies would introduce more
opportunities for human beings to fall short in undertaking the repeated checks and monitoring necessary to make
effective use of the technology. However, Grady also discusses further resort to what he calls “risk dumping”
technologies, which would seek to overcome or compensate for the human shortcomings that generate compliance
errors. See id., at 297-98, 309-13, 334.
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mismatch between the degree of aggregation that is employed in evaluating
due care in human actions versus that which is employed in evaluating due
care in automated processes.47 They provide examples of technologies—
cruise control, traffic lights, and so on—that generate patterns of results
over time.48 Because the full pattern can be observed, errors that would
look like lapses in the individual human actor case are not picked out and
evaluated in isolation but are instead aggregated with the far more prevalent
instances of correct operation for purposes of evaluating whether the
technology meets the due care standard.
Importantly, such technologies embed a verification function: they
ensure that we see the full universe of acts, and that we can observe the true
ratio of good to bad outcomes. The hiccup of a machine with a known error
rate differs from an observed human failing in that it is possible to
immediately see—and verify—its position within a larger pattern of
outcomes.49 In the case of a human lapse, by contrast, fact finders are
observing a single draw from an opaque urn of behavior, a single frame
from an ongoing movie that is otherwise hidden from view. Jurors will be
uncertain whether the behavior they are seeing is indeed a rare lapse
analogous to the error of a generally sound machine, or whether they are
instead glimpsing one instance of an overall pattern of unreasonably risky
behavior.50 For this reason, it is perhaps unsurprising that jurors would
latch onto even legally irrelevant cues that might help them form a
judgment of the defendant’s character.51
To remove the distortion that presently exists between different modes
of precaution, Cooter & Porat recommend a kind of “lapse defense” that
would effectively permit defendants to rely on aggregated information to
demonstrate that they were suffering from an atypical lapse rather than a
typical shortfall.52 Taken to its logical conclusion, this would amount to a
47
Cooter and Porat’s concern about substitution toward machines and away from humans is only one of the
distortions that they discuss. They are also concerned with substitution away from lapse-prone procedures toward
procedures that do not invite lapses but that are riskier overall. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 69-70
(giving examples of alternative ways of delivering babies and treating cancer). These cases can also be viewed as
problems of aggregation: the choice between procedures is a bundled one, but the choices made within a given
procedure are considered a la carte. See infra note 73.
48
See id. at 61-65.
49
On this information problem, see, for example, Grady, supra note 9, at 306-07.
50
This is why, in Grady’s view, allowing a lapse defense would amount to “taking character evidence.”
Grady, supra note 7, at 402. Another concern is whether we can get good insight into lapse rates in a manner that
does not permit gaming.
51
See Grady, supra note 132, at 33 (suggesting that “the modern trend of allowing jury absolution [of
surgical lapses], while not much noted in the economic literature, may respond to the ‘problem’ of what I have
recently called ‘compliance-using’ technology—that is, modern technology that requires high rates of nondurable
precaution”); Janice Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character and Moral Emotion on
Blame, 75(2) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 15-31 (2012) (presenting and discussing experimental results
suggesting that attributions of responsibility for harm are sensitive to extraneous information bearing on an actor’s
perceived moral character).
52
See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 60-73. Grady previously considered such an approach, but
appears to have largely rejected it as impractical. See Grady, supra note 9, at 333 (“A more modest reform would
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change in the unit of analysis for assessing whether due care has been taken.
It would no longer be possible to answer that question based on observation
of a one-off event, but rather would require looking at a larger sample of
behavior. But how would this approach be implemented?
One possibility would be to focus on some facet of the defendant’s
behavior that operates at a higher level of aggregation than the individual
lapsing moment—what Cooter and Porat term “second order precautions.”53
Examples might include routines, plans, or checklists that the defendant
follows as standard operating procedure, even if there was a shortfall on a
particular occasion. Grady has suggested that courts already tend to treat
“precaution plans” differently from individual precautions and will, for
example, view more leniently a surgeon who has adopted a plan of counting
sponges but lapses on a single occasion than a surgeon who lapses in the
absence of such a plan.54 An explicit lapse defense could build on this
approach, although it might induce wasteful expenditures on formalizing
plans that are not consistently followed or that would perhaps even be
inefficient to follow.
Another avenue for obtaining a larger sample of injurer behavior is
suggested by the immense amounts of data that smartphones can collect
(and indeed already collect). For example, some insurance companies offer
discounts to drivers who submit to smartphone-enabled monitoring of their
driving habits.55 The data collected on risky behaviors like hard acceleration
and braking, speeding, and erratic movements currently allow premiums to
better reflect risk profiles.56 But these data could easily be repurposed in
service of a lapse defense.57
An interesting wrinkle surrounding these new monitoring systems is
their capacity to track miles driven.58 This is exactly the sort of activity
be a rule that allowed a doctor to prove that, notwithstanding his inadvertent negligence on the occasion in
question, he was maintaining a reasonable rate of compliance”); Mark F. Grady, supra note 7, at 401 (considering
the possibility that “the court would expand the relevant period of time during which the actor's behavior is
analyzed” to account for inevitable (and hence efficient) lapses, but suggesting this would be impractical because
it “essentially involves taking character evidence, which could be extremely self-serving to the defendant”); see
also Grady, supra note 5, at 905-06 (observing that a system in which “an erring driver or surgeon could have
friends and colleagues testify that the lapse in question was reasonable given the defendant's normally careful
habits” would carry a large administrative cost, although one that might perhaps eventually become worth
bearing).
53
Cooter & Porat, supra note 2, at 339-48.
54
See Grady, supra note 35, at 38-39.
55
See, e.g., Allstate, Safe Drivers Can Get Rewarded with Drivewise, https://www.allstate.com/drivewise.aspx; State Farm, Drive Safe and Save Mobile, https://www.statefarm.com/insurance/auto/discounts/drivesafe-save/mobile-app.
56
Of course, insurance already offers one means of aggregating together behavior and smoothing out the
high variance that actors would otherwise experience. Yet if underlying liability is greater for some precautionary
measures than for others, insurance premiums will reflect that fact, and the distortive effects flagged by Cooter
and Porat will remain.
57
Such an approach could work a hardship on those who do not own a smartphone or are unwilling to have
their every movement tracked. Submitting information about past behavior would presumably be voluntary, but a
fact finder could draw a negative inference if it were not supplied.
58
See,
e.g.,
State
Farm,
Drive
Safe
and
Save
Mobile,
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level information that the negligence standard currently ignores. Having it
more granularly priced into insurance premiums could improve incentives
for drivers. But whether it will indeed be properly priced into liability
premiums would seem to be endogenous to the legal treatment of lapses.59
If lapses give rise to liability as they do presently, then liability premium
pricing should reflect the fact that any driver who drives a lot will
unavoidably lapse from time to time, and may cause an accident. If a lapse
defense became available, however, then it would no longer be the case that
driving a great deal would translate into greater expected liability due to
unavoidable lapses. On the contrary, it might seem that driving a large
number of miles could be helpful to the lapsing driver’s case because it
would increase the base against which a singular lapse would be assessed.
Another possibility for amassing a larger behavioral sample might be a
variation on the information escrowing approach that Ian Ayres has
proposed for sex offenses,60 or the “How’s My Driving” approach that
Lior Strahilevitz has recommended for driving and other behaviors.61 A
record that is clean of complaints over an extended period under conditions
where reporting is widely available could be used to show that a given lapse
was an aberration. Again, however, we might worry if a large amount of an
activity like driving is considered an exonerating factor, given its
contribution to risk creation. Of course, miles driven could also be the basis
of a Pigouvian tax or similar measure designed to overcome such
distortions—though this moves us a step away from an accident-centric
model.
More broadly, making current liability turn on past risk creation would
attenuate the causal relationship upon which tort law is premised; liability
would depend on risk creation over time, and not just on how risk was
created in the incident before the court. This is not necessarily a bad thing,
but it does represent a shift from a model that relies on pairing up injurers,
victims, and accidents on a one-to-one basis. Due care would no longer be
evaluated solely in the context of one’s behavior toward one’s counterparty,
but would instead be evaluated across time in one’s interactions with
innumerable potential counterparties. Contrary to the standard assumptions
https://www.statefarm.com/insurance/auto/discounts/drive-safe-save/mobile-app (“The fewer miles you drive and
the safer you drive, the more you could save on auto insurance”).
59
The discussion in the text refers just to liability premiums (second-party insurance). We would expect the
mileage information to be priced into collision premiums (for damage to the insured’s own car) regardless of the
legal regime, because this exposure exists independent of liability judgments. Indeed, if a lapse defense were
widely available, we would expect collision premiums to be even more sensitive to miles driven, because there
would be fewer instances in which a lapsing driver would be liable for the damage to the insured’s vehicle, and
more time on the road would mean more exposure to other drivers’ lapses.
60
Ian Ayres, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145 (2012). For an earlier discussion of a similar
approach, inspired by the “recorder” system used in competitive contract bridge, see Frederick Schauer & Richard
Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 48-52 (1996).
61
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” For Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699
(2006).
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of tort law, proof of negligence would be found “in the air”62 –or at least in
the modus operandi of the defendant.
C. A Disaggregating Alternative
There is another way to alleviate the imbalance between the law’s
treatment of human lapses and other kinds of failure rates: by imposing
strict liability for accidents caused when mechanized or routinized systems
are used to control particular operations.63 This is the inverse of Cooter and
Porat’s proposal. Instead of compiling a larger sample of human behavior,
the “behavior” of the machine or procedure would be effectively
disaggregated by treating each failure as a basis for liability. This would
remove the distortion as effectively as would the creation of a lapse defense,
because there would no longer be an incentive to substitute an automated or
routine process solely for the purpose of taking advantage of evaluative
aggregation. If the mechanical procedure were really superior to a particular
set of human decisions, however, it would still be employed. Negligence
would remain the standard for the human-mediated actions, but human
lapses would still give rise to liability in the manner that currently occurs,
with the attendant (salutary) pressure on activity levels.
This approach raises two questions. First, can the law justify holding
people responsible for lapses that no one could possibly avoid? Second, can
the application of a nominally divergent standard for human and automated
acts be justified? The key to the first question is to see a negligence
standard as a safe harbor from liability that the law extends to actors under
certain instrumentally-defined circumstances,64 not an inalienable human
right to inflict all the harm on others that due care would not prevent (or
even all the harm that one cannot personally help causing). The answer to
the second question turns on the implicit role of aggregation and
disaggregation in evaluating care, which translates nominally divergent
standards into substantively equivalent ones.
To start, consider liability for human lapses, which is currently the
law,65 and which follows from the practice of evaluating each lapse in
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (“Proof of negligence
in the air, so to speak, will not do.”) (quoting Pollock, Torts (11th Ed.) p. 455).
63
This is how products liability already works in the context of manufacturing defects. The individual
defective product forms the unit of analysis for establishing liability, and it is no defense that due care was taken
in mass production techniques. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and
The Fault in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L REV 743, 773-74 (2016) (analogizing the inevitable errors of mass
production to the inevitable errors of a driver or surgeon over a long enough span of time).
64
For one discussion of the implications of safe harbors in tort law, see Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty,
Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 355-56, 364
(1991). For an illuminating recent discussion of safe harbors in general (and their converse, areas of per se
liability) see generally Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385 (2016).
64
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970).
65
There are arguably some limited exceptions in the law, such as for emergencies or certain momentary
62

31-Aug-17]

ACCIDENTS AND AGGREGATES

15

isolation. This does mean holding actors responsible for harm that they
could not help causing—conditional on having chosen to engage in the
activity in question at a given level. But holding people responsible for
shortcomings they could not prevent is already an entrenched and pervasive
feature of our negligence regime, which does not tailor liability to match the
particular abilities of different actors.66 Consider the inherently clumsy
person who cannot meet the ordinary standard of reasonableness, but who is
nonetheless held liable if his clumsiness causes harm.67 As a number of
scholars have noted, the law’s failure to tailor the due care standard
introduces a pocket of strict liability into the negligence system.68 Where
an actor cannot reach the safe harbor of due care, she is required to cover
the (unavoidable, for her) costs of her actions.
An actor who cannot meet the standard of due care for a given activity
may therefore find herself forced, as a liability-limiting measure, to reduce
her participation in the activity or drop out of it altogether. Yet unless there
is some reason that people should be encouraged to engage in certain
activities at particular levels, the fact that people will respond to a regime
that holds them liable for harms they cannot help causing by doing less of
an activity or dropping out of the activity altogether seems like a point in
favor of the approach.69 To be sure, there are instances in which the desire
distractions. See COOTER AND PORAT, supra note 15, at 63-66; Grady, supra note 5, at 901-02. But these do not
serve to generally excuse the shortfalls in attention or forgotten precautions that plague many repetitive tasks.
66
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 636
(2016) (“Current law does not personalize standards of care. It adheres, instead, to a regime of uniform,
nonpersonalized standards.”). There are some instances where some tailoring does occur, as for children engaged
in children’s activities, but there is no general scaling of the due care standard to match the particular abilities of
each actor. See, e.g., id. at 637-44 (discussing instances in which the law “permits some partition of the reference
group against which an actor's behavior is judged”). The law’s approach to this question has been the subject of
some analysis and critique. See generally id. (arguing that negligence law should be “personalized” to match
individual differences in skill and riskiness); Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of
Negligence: Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and
Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241 (1989) (analyzing standards of care in negligence and concluding that the approaches
taken by courts tend to roughly reflect tradeoffs in the costs of misincentives and of obtaining information about
optimal care levels, despite some areas of concern).
67
As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., famously put it, “If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is
always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for
in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty
neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the courts
which they establish decline to take his personal equation into account.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
68
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271, 272 & n.6 (2012)
(collecting sources on this point); Grady, supra note 5, at 896-98 & nn 24-25 (same); id. at 897 n.24 (“In the 20
years that have elapsed since [Guido] Calabresi published The Costs of Accidents, his theory about the pocket of
strict liability has guided practically all thinking on the subject.”); see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 63,
at 746-48, 754-57 (discussing this view and characterizing such unavoidable conduct as “strict liability wrongs”).
69
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 66, at 242 (“When we use an objective standard to measure the adequacy
of the care taken while engaging in the activity, people who are poorly equipped to take care exclude themselves
from the activity because they view the applicable standard of care as excessively onerous.”). As Schwartz notes,
it is also possible to use a subjective standard of care to screen out those who should not participate in the activity
by making the question of engagement in the activity an explicit part of the negligence inquiry. Id. While this
approach may be sensible under some conditions, it often confronts serious information problems, including how
to value the benefits that individual actors glean from engaging in an activity, and what actual activity levels were.
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for broader participation in certain activities essential to human flourishing,
or the need for children to go through a learning phase, or the high social
value associated with certain form of inclusiveness will militate in favor of
tailoring. But the fact that we already have a system that holds many actors
responsible for shortfalls they cannot help is often regarded as a functional
aspect of tort law rather than a cause for concern.70
Lapses, too, represent a way in which strains of strict liability work their
way into a negligence system.71 As already suggested, the resulting
metering effect may be desirable, since the negligence system on its own
fails to effectively control activity levels. What seems most problematic, I
posit, is not the fact of expected liability for lapses but rather the high
variance in individual results associated with those lapses.72 Where
insurance markets are available to translate the high-variance individual
results into more predictable expected value “taxes” on activity levels, the
results may seem less troublesome. To be sure, we still must worry about
the distortive effects that Cooter and Porat identify if different preventative
technologies give rise to different levels of underlying liability, since the
mere translation of realized results into expected values does not address
that disparity. This brings us to the second half of the proposed approach,
which would remove this distortion by applying strict liability to automated
processes that produce errors at predictable rates.
Here, we can start by asking why an ordinary negligence standard does
not already reach errors made by machines.73 The reason, presumably, is
that the machine’s errors are evaluated in the aggregate (as an “error rate”)
See, e.g., id. at 279; SHAVELL, supra note 38, at 25-26. Some of these information problems may be abating,
however. See generally Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 66 (discussing the role of “Big Data” in advancing a
personalization agenda).
70
The degree to which unattainable standards of care will induce overinvestment in precautions by potential
injurers depends on the extent to which the law imposes a “cliff effect” at the point of due care by holding
negligent actors liable for accidents that their negligence did not cause. See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 66, at
652-53. This issue is take up in Part II, infra.
71
See e.g., Grady, supra note 9, at 299-300, 307.
72
Grady notes a number of other concerns, including making defendants into insurers of plaintiffs and
forcing plaintiffs to (effectively) buy excessive amounts of insurance against injury. Larger reforms like increased
use of first-party insurance, reverse insurance markets, and subsidies keyed to positive externalities might be used
to address these problems, which are not unique to the lapse setting but rather relate to the kinds of recoveries that
are available and the effects of strict liability more generally.
73
A separate inquiry is why the law would not treat the decision to use the automated process as itself
negligent, if it were in fact true that overall expected accident costs would be lower with the human-mediated
process (notwithstanding the lapses). Doing so would make the machine-user liable for all harms caused by that
choice. The (unsatisfying) doctrinal answer is that the decision to use a particular technique or procedure is
unlikely to be second-guessed (especially in medical malpractice) as long as each procedure is well-accepted in
the field and meets customary standards of care. This means that the fixed or inherent risks associated with a
given procedure do not typically give rise to a finding of negligence, even if another procedure would have fewer
of these fixed or inherent risks, and more “variable” or lapse-based risks. Leveling the playing field in this context
would require applying strict liability to accidents that occur under the inherently riskier procedure (or, put
differently, treating it as negligent simply to have chosen the riskier procedure, given the existence of another
procedure that entails less overall risk). Viewed in this light, we can understand the “automated processes”
situation as a special case of a more general problem: that the bundled choice between procedures is typically
given less scrutiny than errors that occur within procedures.
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and the process is deemed to be nonnegligent so long as there is no costeffective precaution that could have reduced the overall loss rate. A plaintiff
might attempt to argue that the specific failure in question could have been
cost effectively avoided by a trivial intervention had a person been present
to catch the failure. Yet a person’s presence cannot be instantly conjured up
only at the moments of failure; catching the machine’s error would require
continuous human presence throughout the machine’s operation. If it would
not have been cost effective to hire a person for the entire running of the
machine, the error could not have been avoided in a cost effective manner.
And it seems unduly anthropomorphic to suggest that the machine itself
behaved negligently in those moments of failure.
In the case of human lapses, the same reasoning might be attempted.
For example, a driver might argue that she would effectively have to hire a
“second self” (an assistant) to watch over her shoulder to prevent the
inevitable occasional lapse, and that this would not be cost effective. But
because one’s own attention to the task at hand is viewed as a resource that
can be expanded and contracted at will, it is assumed that one could always
have paid just a bit more attention at the time of failure—whether or not this
is realistic. Thus in the machine case two different lumpy precautions
become conceptually severable: one for a machine with a certain error rate,
and the second for a full-time human overseer. Having invested in the first,
investing in the second is not cost-justified.74 In the human case, the
operator with a certain error rate and her on-demand double-checker are
believed to be embodied in one and the same individual. The two lumpy
precautions in the machine case are replaced with a continuous spectrum of
caretaking that is thought to be open to the human individual as she goes
about a judgment intensive task like driving.
Now that we see the nature of the problem, the rationale becomes clear
for moving to strict liability in the machine case while keeping the
negligence standard in place in the human error case. The assertion that
doing so will chill innovation and thwart safety-enhancing moves to
automation75 ignores the implicit role of evaluative aggregation in
determining liability outcomes. It assumes that the human to machine
comparison is apples to apples, when it is really apples to orchards.76 Given
74
This might not always be the case, of course; there might be some machines that perform so poorly that
adding an attendant would be cost justified. See infra Part II (examining issues surrounding additive and substitute
precautions).
75
See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, Allocating Liability for Computer-Generated Torts 3 (unpublished working paper,
2016) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877380 (“Holding human operators liable in negligence and
computer operators strictly liable for the same sorts of harms means that tort law discourages automation.”).
76
Cooter and Porat are, in effect, urging an orchards to orchards comparison—one that would either
aggregate behavior into larger patterns or look at the use of durable “second-order” precautions designed to
produce particular patterns over time. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 70-72; Cooter & Porat, supra note
4, at 339-48 (discussing how “second-order precautions” can reduce the probability of a lapse and urging a
“second-order reasonableness defense” to lapses). Abbott’s suggestion that humans should be evaluated under a
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the tendency toward evaluative disaggregation in the human case and the
tendency toward evaluative aggregation in the mechanized case, a (nominal)
negligence standard in the former paired with strict liability in the latter
merely levels the playing field. And it does so in a way that conserves on
information costs, because it eliminates the need to investigate the human’s
overall “error rate.”
This approach dovetails with other policy considerations that support
strict liability for automated processes.77 The use of a routinized or
mechanized process suggests significant repetition of actions and the
capacity to determine in advance overall levels of exposure. Repeat play
and risk-bearing capacity are often invoked to support strict liability, framed
as enterprise liability.78 And, in fact, the law tends to treat repeat play
enterprises carried out on a broad scale differently from one-off activities
carried out by individuals. For example, modern products liability law has
evolved to a strict liability standard for manufacturing defects. Even though
a manufacturer may choose a process that has a very low error rate and no
further cost justified precautions are available, liability still follows in cases
of failure.79 The very predictability associated with the low failure rate
enables effective cost reduction and appropriate choices about activity
levels. The broader point is that the lumpiness in outcomes associated with
accidents is mediated by repetition, transforming what might in the
individual case be an outlier observation into part of a larger pattern.
II. STACKING CARE
Aggregation also enters into judgments about untaken precautions.
Recall the example of the unfenced cricket field and the brained
pedestrian.80 An eight-foot fence—one high enough to stop the ball—
appeared cost-justified when considered as a unit. But the last two feet of
the fence were not cost-justified at the margin, and the optimal six-foot
fence would not have prevented the accident. Should the defendant be able
to avoid liability by demonstrating this fact, or should the plaintiff be free to
choose how to aggregate together or break apart the precautionary steps that
negligence standard as if they were computers, although similar in tenor, contemplates a standard that humans
would generally be unable to meet. See Abbott, supra note 75, at 36 (“A computer standard of care essentially
makes people strictly liable for their accidental harms.”).
77
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Carmakers Be Liable When a Self-Driving Car Crashes? FORBES,
Sept. 22, 2016, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2016/09/22/should-carmakers-be-liablewhen-a-self-driving-car-crashes/#143fd9001f40 (offering an insurance rationale for automaker liability and
suggesting that it would not produce distortive effects).
78
See, e.g., Keating, supra note 122. For historical background and a critique of enterprise liability, see
generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
79
See, e.g., COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 66; Keating, supra note 122.
80
See notes supra and accompanying text.
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the defendant failed to take?
This example presents the precaution aggregation puzzle with unusual
clarity. The neatly stacked fence heights with known costs and projectilestopping properties enable us to partition the defendant’s untaken
precaution—the failure to build any fence at all—into two parts: a negligent
omission (failing to construct the first six feet) and an efficient omission
(failing to build beyond six feet). Moreover, because the hypothetical states
the height of the exiting ball with certainty, it is readily apparent whether
the defendant’s negligent omission or merely her efficient omission was
responsible for the accident. This atypically unambiguous setup makes the
liability question appear deceptively simple.
A. Marginal Analysis and Causation
One of the most basic lessons of economics is that analysis must be
conducted “at the margin.”81 Whether you are deciding how tall to build a
fence, how many widgets to make, or how many cookies to eat, a surefire
way to get the wrong answer is to continue building, manufacturing, or
eating until your total costs begin to outweigh your total benefits. That
stopping point will be much too late in any situation where marginal costs
are rising, marginal benefits are falling, or both. Under these conditions,
which are highly typical, the first units in the sequence will have a much
more favorable ratio of benefits to costs than the later units in the sequence.
In making decisions about each subsequent unit, what matters is whether
the benefits of that unit outweigh the costs of that unit. As soon as the
answer stops being yes, it’s time to immediately stop adding units.
Continuing beyond that point will mean adding units that are more costly
than beneficial, even though it may take some time for the deficits that they
introduce to eat away the surplus of benefits over costs associated with the
earlier units and bring the total cost-benefit ratio into the red.
Applying marginal analysis to our cricket case identifies the point at
which an actor who was taking due care would have ceased adding height to
the fence. In our example, that stopping point would be six feet. Thus it
might seem like a red herring to assert that an eight-foot fence, considered
as a unit, would produce total benefits that exceed total costs. But the fact
81
This principle, familiar from economics, turns up in some decided tort cases. See WILLIAM M. LANDES
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 99-100 (1987) (observing that the court’s
analysis in Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 11 Exch. 781, 156 Engl. Rep. 1047 (1856) evidenced “an
implicit concern with marginal or incremental rather than total costs of care”). As Landes and Posner explain,
“The [Blyth] court was not interested in whether the total costs of burying the main to a depth at which it would
not have burst even in the unusually severe frost of 1855 were less than the expected accident costs of the pipes'
bursting. It was interested in whether, given that the mains had been buried to a depth that would prevent their
freezing in any ordinary frosts, the incremental expense of protecting against an unusually severe frost would be
justified by the incremental reduction in accident costs resulting from such an expense.” Id. at 100.
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that six feet rather than eight feet is the correct stopping point for an actor
who is exercising due care does not, on its own, tell us what the legal
response should be to a defendant who never started building a fence at all.
It might seem uncontroversial that, in a negligence regime, a defendant
cannot be held liable unless her negligence caused an accident.82 That
premise suggests the following simple two-step operation: (1) identify the
optimal fence height using marginal analysis; and (2) see if the defendant’s
failure to build a fence of that optimal height caused the accident. If not,
then there should be no liability. But this analysis embeds a questionable
assumption about the respite from liability that a negligence regime
provides. On an efficiency analysis, the shape of that respite should depend
on the incentives that it produces for actors, which depend in turn on how
different doctrinal formulations interact with tort law’s specific architecture.
If we view a negligence regime not as setting the outer boundaries for
appropriately imposed liability but rather as offering a safe harbor83 when a
defendant has (actually) done all that might efficiently be done to prevent an
accident, the problem looks different. In other words, it is not self-evident
that a negligent defendant is entitled to have her omissions partitioned into
negligent and efficient increments when she has failed to undertake the
partitioning work herself by exercising due care. This reframing allows us
to turn to the question of how best to minimize the costs of accidents,
including the costs of preventing accidents and of administering the
system.84 The next section takes up that inquiry. Drawing on Mark Grady’s
analysis,85 I show how the aggregation choices used in assessing
precautions represent a powerful but underappreciated way to fine-tune tort
law incentives—with surprising results for our cricket example.
B. Unifying Untaken Precautions
In many areas of law, a defendant becomes liable only after her
behavior aggregates to a certain point or crosses a certain line—yet once she
does cross the line, her behavior is treated (without comment) as an
indivisible unit. Next to nothing separates the driver who is just over the
line that demarcates driving while intoxicated and the driver who is just
below that line. Still, a driver who is just over the line will suffer
consequences that are harsher than could be explained by comparing her
behavior’s expected social costs with those of her trivially less intoxicated
counterpart. The line, we understand, has to be drawn somewhere—but this
82
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 11, at 4; COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 23 (“Under prevailing law and
causation principles, liability should be imposed only for harms caused by the injurer’s negligence.”).
83
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
84
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970).
85
See, e.g., Grady, supra note 15.
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does not mean the line-crosser is entitled to have everything below the line
cleared from her account, or to partition her intoxication into the segments
falling above and below the legal limit.86 Thus, she cannot limit her
exposure by demonstrating that she would have driven almost as badly had
she not taken the last sip that put her over the legal limit. Having actually
crossed the line, she forfeits the protective benefits the line otherwise would
have afforded to her below-threshold conduct.87
Of course, in the drunk driving context, as in other criminal contexts, we
may tolerate or even welcome a cliff effect in order to get meaningful
deterrence. To use Robert Cooter’s phrasing, “sanctions” seem more
appropriate than mere “prices.”88 Tort law is different in that there are
significant social costs to overshooting as well as undershooting due care.
But even when a price (and not a sanction) is what we seek, that price still
must be set appropriately. For reasons to be explained below, permitting
defendants to partition an untaken precaution identified by plaintiffs into
negligent and nonnegligent omissions would apply a distortive discount to
the tort system’s pricing mechanism. To see why, we must first step back
to examine how a negligence regime operates.
1. Negligent Defendants and Efficient Accidents
Unpacking the cricket fence problem first requires pinpointing the
essential difference between negligence and strict liability. The two
approaches differ in their treatment of accidents that happen even though
everyone is exercising due care. To prevent all accidents would require a
level of precaution that would cost society far more than it would be
worth.89 This is why we do not set all speed limits at ten miles per hour,
require cars to be built like tanks, or mandate the wearing of body armor at
all times.90 The costs of “efficient accidents”91—those that occur even when
86
Indeed, if asked to articulate what the drunk driver did wrong, we would probably say something like,
“downing four beers in quick succession and then getting behind the wheel” not “driving after taking the tiny sip
that put her blood alcohol level over the legal limit.”
87
This result is not inevitable, of course. The law could be made more continuous in its effects by punishing
people only for the marginal impacts of their over-the-limit conduct. See Kolber, supra note 22, at 293 (“If one is
especially concerned about the horizontal inequity of giving the slightly less culpable no punishment at all, we
could eliminate the inequity simply by punishing all offenders only to the extent that their conduct exceeds the
threshold.”). But the fact that this is not how law usually operates remains suggestive. See also infra Part IV.C
(observing that regulatory takings liability charges the government with the full impact of a regulatory action that
goes “too far”—not just the “too far” portion of it.).
88
Cooter, supra note 15.
89
See generally CALABRESI, supra note 84.
90
See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 9 (1985) (using the example of cars “built like tanks” that “cannot go faster than ten miles
per hour” to emphasize that the costs of safety can at times be unacceptably large).
91
See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 269 (1974) (referring to “nonnegligent” accidents as “efficient” ones). Accidents that could not have been
prevented through the exercise of due care are often referred to in the legal literature as “unavoidable,” but this is
a misnomer. See Grady, supra note 5, at 910 & n.73 (describing this usage and observing that “most unavoidable
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everyone is being as careful as it makes sense to be—must fall on someone.
Negligence law leaves these costs to fall on the victims, while strict liability
assigns the losses from these efficient accidents to the injurer. When an
injurer in a negligence regime falls short of the due care standard, however,
she exposes herself to liability. But how much liability?
To return to our example above, should the cricket club that has
negligently failed to build any fence at all be liable for the harm caused by
all braining balls that leave the field (regardless of altitude), only those
errant balls that would have been stopped by an optimal six-foot fence, or
some group of escaping orbs that falls in between these two alternatives?
The academic literature on this topic notes correctly that the first alternative,
which we might call the “harming while negligent” (HWN) approach,
creates a cliff of liability—fall one iota short of due care and all bets are off!
Under this approach, the actor would face liability for the efficient accidents
that otherwise would have been charged to the victim, as well as the ones
that the actor’s negligence itself actually caused. Such a discontinuity puts a
great deal of pressure on actors to make sure they meet the due care
standard; it imposes a sanction, and not a mere price, on falling short.92
Yet it seems wrong doctrinally. Surely the cricket club should not be
liable for a freak cricket ball that flies out of the field at an altitude of sixty
feet under a negligence regime, since no reasonable fence could have
stopped it from happening. And, in fact, it appears that courts do not impose
liability on negligent actors where it is clear that behaving with due care
would not have kept the accident from happening.93 This does not mean
defendants always benefit from a surgical separation of negligent omissions
from efficient omissions. On the contrary, two kinds of uncertainty allow
those categories to be routinely blurred together. One is uncertainty about
which increment of the defendant’s omission caused the harm. Often, the
negligent portion of the defendant’s conduct caused the harm with some
positive probability but not with certainty, as will be discussed below.94 For
now, it is sufficient to observe that this form of factual uncertainty likely
causes negligent defendants to be liable for more harm than would be
statistically associated with their negligent omissions alone.95
accidents can indeed be avoided, but at excessive cost”). “Efficient accidents,” while closer to the mark, is
potentially misleading as well. Some of the means through which these accidents might be reduced, such as
curtailing activity levels, do not get picked up in standard due care analyses but might be efficient for actors to
undertake; if so, the accidents thus avoided would not have been “efficient” ones, even though “due care” (as
standardly understood) could not have prevented them.
92
See Cooter, supra note 15.
93
See Wright, supra note 15, at 84 (stating that courts “have consistently limited negligence liability to
injuries that were caused by the negligent aspect of the injurer's activity”); see also COOTER & PORAT supra note
15, at 23-25 (distinguishing cases of perfect and imperfect causal attribution).
94
To be explored further in Part III below.
95
It is possible that factual uncertainty about causation is resolved symmetrically. See Kahan, supra note 11,
at 442 (considering the possibility that finders of fact might “semiautomatically” find causation once negligence
was established but finding it “also plausible to assume that some fact finders resolve these difficult questions in
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A second source of uncertainty concerns the position of the due care
standard, the dividing line between a defendant’s negligent omissions and
her efficient omissions. In many cases, it will be evident that a defendant
fell below any plausible standard of due care yet remain unclear exactly
how much more was necessary to achieve due care. Here, we might expect
a systematic skew in the direction of liability, especially if due care is
evaluated in a manner endogenous to the choices the defendant actually
made about precautions. In the absence of a clear external standard for due
care (such as a speed limit), attention tends to focus on “the untaken
precaution”—the content of which depends on what the defendant actually
did.96 The cricket hypothetical enables us to observe this potential for
endogeneity at close range and evaluate whether it represents a feature or a
bug.
The balance of this section considers how to approach the liability of
negligent defendants where a marginal analysis establishes that taking due
care would not have prevented the harm in question. The HWN standard
discussed above will be compared with a “harming because negligent”
(HBN) approach, as well as with a hybrid alternative falling between these
extremes—what Mark Grady calls a “cost-benefit rule,”97 and which I will
refer to here as the “unified untaken precaution” (UUP) rule.
2.

Cliffs and Ledges

Consider a rule that would limit the defendant’s liability to those
accidents that were actually caused by her negligence—in other words, an
HBN regime. Such an approach eliminates the cliff of liability that can
confront defendants who fall just a little short of due care under an HWN
approach. To be sure, the cliff provides a powerful incentive to reach the
requisite level of due care, and perfectly informed and rational actors would
simply meet that standard without fail. But commentators worry that
uncertainty and mistakes by both actors and factfinders can conspire to
produce overdeterrence—or, alternatively, disproportionately harsh results
stemming from relatively minor shortfalls (or perceived shortfalls).
Yet the HBN alternative leaves in place a cliff ledge that may be just as
problematic: liability sits at zero for all harms that due care would not
the favor of injurers”). The question is an empirical one, but it seems likely that a factfinder faced with a plainly
harmed plaintiff, a plainly negligent defendant, and factual uncertainty running only to which facet of the
defendant’s conduct produced the harm will err on the side of finding liability. See infra Part III. b
96
See Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 143 (1989) (arguing that courts “take
the plaintiff’s allegations of the untaken precautions of the defendant and ask, in light of the precautions that had
been taken, whether some particular precaution promised benefits (in accident reduction) greater than its
associated costs.”). A failure of due care may also be inferred from the fact of the accident in some cases,
following the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See id. at 141 & n.7 (collecting literature).
97
See Grady, supra note 15, at 814-21 (describing and depicting this approach).
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prevent. Not only is an actor who failed to exercise due care excused from
the associated accident costs, an actor who goes beyond due care gets no
further credit for reducing these accident costs.98 There is, at the point of
due care, a sharp drop-off (to zero) in the private returns that the actor
internalizes for taking more increments of care, even though societal
benefits associated with those added increments of care may remain quite
significant.99 That discontinuity—what we might call a ledge effect—
matters too.100 Uncertainties that are thought to present difficulties for the
HWN regime re-emerge here to generate drawbacks for the HBN approach,
as Grady has carefully demonstrated.101
Consider an actor like the cricket club that must decide whether to err
on the side of going above or falling below due care, where there is
uncertainty about exactly how a court will evaluate its conduct.102 The
club’s owner has to shell out money for each increment of fencing height.
If she builds too high, she will be wasting her money, because her liability
is already at zero once due care is achieved, and she receives no credit for
going further. If she builds too low, however, she will save on fencing costs
and will only expose herself to the incremental accident costs associated
with the amount by which she fell short. As a result, mistakes in the
direction of too much care will cost her more than mistakes in the direction
of too little care.103 Thus, actors in an HBN regime may be inclined to err
on the side of stopping short of due care.
A numeric example will clarify. Suppose the schedule of marginal costs
and benefits for increasing fence heights between five and eight feet is as
shown in Table 2.
98
The fact that due care has been reached does not mean that no further reductions in accident costs are
possible; it simply means that those reductions cost more than they are worth. Although the lack of net social
value associated with these further accident reductions means that they should not be undertaken in a world of
perfect information, they nonetheless matter when an actor must decide whether to err on the side of more or
fewer precautions.
99
This can be readily demonstrated by considering a case where risks and precautions are perfectly
continuous. As the actor approaches the level of due care, she spends $1.00 to gain $1.01 in accident reduction
benefits, and should stop when marginal costs reaches the marginal benefit (spending $1.00 to save $1.00). If she
goes $1.00 further, accident costs fall by .99, but she internalizes none of those social gains. Her liability is zero
whether she spends the extra dollar or not. What is from society’s standpoint an overexpenditure that costs just
one penny (net) is from the actor’s perspective an error that costs a full dollar, because she gets nothing in return.
100
Although Grady’s analysis does not put matters in quite these terms, his graphical representation of the
operation of his P*-cutoff rule illustrates this discontinuity. See Grady, supra note 15, at 812-13 & fig.3 (showing
that the costs internalized to the actor rise sharply as she moves past the point of due care, creating an asymmetry
with her cost profile before reaching due care).
101
See id. at 801-06 & fig.1; 812-13 & fig.3.
102
See id. at 806-21 (analyzing and depicting the choice between underprecaution and overprecaution, given
uncertainty, under different legal rules). Significantly, this uncertainty is the primary reason why the HBN versus
HWN choice matters. In the absence of such uncertainty, the actor would simply comply with due care, and that
would be that. See id. at 806-09. Of course, some actors cannot meet the due care standard easily or at all, while
all actors face some inevitable lapses, and for these actors a negligence standard already inserts an element of
strict liability—one that the HWN regime would exacerbate. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
103
For a graphical demonstration of this point, see Grady, supra note 15, at 812-13 & fig. 3; see also id. at
801-06 & fig. 1.

31-Aug-17]

ACCIDENTS AND AGGREGATES

25

Table 2: Fencing Costs and Benefits
Marginal Cost
of Construction

Increase
from 5’ to 6’
Increase
from 6’ to 7’
Increase
from 7’ to 8’

Marginal
Benefit to Actor
(HBN Regime)

Marginal Benefit
to Society

100

175

175

100

0

75

100

0

25

Here, due care on a Hand Formula account requires building to, but not
above, six feet (assuming that only integer fences are possible). Beyond
that point, construction costs exceed savings in accident costs.
Now consider the problem from the viewpoint of a cricket club that is
uncertain ex ante what fence height will be judged optimal. An upward
deviation from the optimal six foot fence to a seven foot fence will cost the
cricket club an extra $100 in construction costs but will not save it anything
in accident costs since liability is already sitting at zero. So it loses $100 on
net by guessing too high about the standard of care. A downward deviation
from the optimal six foot fence to a five foot fence will mean bearing an
extra $175 in expected accident costs, but it will also mean saving $100 in
construction costs. The net cost of guessing too low is just $75. The actor
will, therefore, err on the side of too little precaution.
From society’s standpoint, the calculation looks different. The cost of
the upward mistake is just $25. Even though an extra $100 is spent on
construction, there is a $75 savings in accident costs to help offset it. The
downward mistake, on the other hand, costs society the full $75 that it costs
the actor. On these numbers, society would prefer that the actor make the
upward mistake rather than the downward mistake.104 Of course, it will not
always be the case that a downward mistake is more costly than an upward
mistake—that will depend on the specific profile of costs and benefits
associated with the available changes in fence heights.105 The important
104
Of course, society would prefer that the actor stop at exactly the level of due care, since going further
costs more in precaution than it saves in accident costs. But if a mistake is to be made, it would prefer the less
costly of the two.
105
The two types of errors (undershooting and overshooting) are equally socially costly, but the magnitudes
of a given mistake may differ, owing to factors like lumpiness in precautionary technologies (here, the integeronly fences). In some cases, lumpiness in precautionary alternatives will actually help to remove distortions in
decisionmaking by producing greater convergence between the privately optimal strategy and the socially optimal
strategy, while in other cases it does the opposite. See Lee Anne Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity, IOWA L. REV.
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point is that the ledge effect baked into the negligence standard will cause
injurers’ errors to skew low with an HBN rule, rather than center on the
optimal point.106
Compare now the calculation the club owner would make under an
HWN standard that makes a negligent actor liable for all braining balls,
regardless of altitude. Now, she will choose to overshoot due care rather
than undershoot.107 If she only builds to five feet, she will be liable not just
for the $175 in expected costs for the increment in between five feet and six
feet, but also the accidents that occur when balls exit the feet at seven, eight,
and sixty feet (and all other heights). This means she will also be on the
hook for the additional $75 in expected costs that would have been saved by
the six-foot to seven-foot increment, the additional $25 in expected costs
associated with balls exiting in the seven-foot to eight-foot range, and all
the costs for balls higher than that. To save $100 in construction costs she
exposes herself to at least $275 in liability, or a net cost of $175 or more.
Making a mistake in the other direction and building to seven feet is less
costly in this regime. True, she spends $100 more on construction and does
not get any benefit from society’s $75 in cost savings. But a $100 mistake
is cheaper than a $175 dollar mistake.
Grady’s analysis makes the case for an intermediate alternative, one that
he suggests hews most closely to what courts actually do.108 This approach
would impose liability on a negligent defendant only in those cases where
the plaintiff can identify an untaken precaution that satisfies two criteria: (1)
it would have prevented the accident; and (2) taken as a whole, the
precaution’s benefits in terms of accident reduction exceed its costs.109 In
short, the precaution (considered as a unit) must be both causally effective
and cost effective. Under such a regime, liability would follow in the
hypothetical where the cricket club constructed no fence at all, the ball
sailed out at just under eight feet, and the eight foot fence, taken as a whole,
would have been cost-justified. Because this approach relies on artificially
“unifying” the untaken precaution for purposes of evaluating negligence
liability, I call it the “unified untaken precaution” (UUP) rule.
The workings of this rule can be explained intuitively. To be
incentivized to dead-center her behavior on due care, an actor must bear
(2015). None of this changes the fact that an HBN regime has a tendency to make precautions skew low, but
lumpiness in precautionary steps can ameliorate or exacerbate the effects of that tendency in certain cases.
106
See Grady, supra note 15.
107
See Grady, supra note 15, at 809-12 & fig. 2 (explaining and depicting this point).
108
Id. at 814-29 (describing his “cost-benefit” approach).
109
See id. at 815 (explaining that under his approach, courts would “find an injurer negligent whenever the
costs of at least one specific untaken precaution are less than the reduction in expected harm that would have
resulted from the precaution” and “would then impose liability if the specific act of negligence used to prove the
breach of duty was the cause in fact of the harm the victim suffered”); Grady, supra note 25, at 673 (describing
the cost-benefit analysis and the causal inquiry as “two different rings of fire” that a proposed untaken precaution
must clear).
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equivalent costs for overshooting due care and undershooting due care. But,
as we have seen, an actor bears more costs than society does when she
overshoots due care in a negligence regime, but the same costs as society
does when she undershoots due care. The actor’s liability is zero through
the whole range of conduct above the due care line, so every penny she
spends on excess precaution buys her no benefits at all, even though it does
still buy society additional benefits (albeit ones that are not worth their full
cost). This divergence between the costs to society of the overshooting
mistake and the costs to the actor herself will create a skew in the direction
of insufficient care under an HBN regime.
To correct that skew requires increasing the costs that attach to
undershooting due care just enough that the actor is left indifferent between
overshooting and undershooting.110 The HWN approach cannot accomplish
this sensitive task. Instead, it bluntly overcorrects with a cliff of unlimited
liability that creates a skew in the opposite direction, toward too much care.
Anyone who falls even a little short of due care can be liable for any
accidents she causes, under an HWN rule. The UUP approach, by contrast,
makes the degree of extra exposure added to undershooting errors
dependent on the degree to which the actor undershot due care. This is
accomplished by allowing a victim to specify—and, crucially, treat as an
indivisible unit—any untaken precaution that meets the criteria of cost
effectiveness and causal effectiveness.
When an injurer has been negligent, such a qualifying untaken
precaution can extend beyond the point of due care.111 By treating the
proffered untaken precaution as a single unit, a court is effectively
comparing the precaution’s total costs with its total benefits.112 As we saw
above, total benefits can continue to exceed total costs well beyond the
optimal stopping point on a marginal analysis, because the surpluses from
the early (efficient) units subsidize deficits in the later (inefficient) units.113
Still, the requirement of cost effectiveness provides an important constraint:
the actor can be held liable for untaken precautions that exceed due care, but
only to the extent of the surplus of benefits over costs associated with the
untaken increments actually falling short of due care. The larger the
defendant’s error, the more socially costly her shortfall, the greater the

110
Alternatively, were it possible, society could rebate to the actor the accident cost savings associated with
overshooting due care.
111
See Grady, supra note 25, at 660 (“Untaken precautions beyond the efficient set appear cost-beneficial
only when the injurer has used less precaution than due care.”).
112
To be clear, the court is examining the marginal cost of the precaution as a whole with the marginal
benefit of the precaution as a whole. But the marginal steps contained within the envelope of “the precaution” are
ignored, as are any marginal differences between a lesser precaution and the proffered one.
113
See supra Part II.A; see also Grady, supra note 25, at 671-72 (“When courts conduct cost-benefit analysis
of alternative untaken precautions, the surplus on the movement up to the efficient level allows the precaution to
extend into a zone where the last part of it is producing a deficit.”).
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potential for liability for untaken precautions extending beyond due care.114
Under certain assumptions, including perfect linearity, the UUP
approach adds consequences to the insufficient care side of the line that
exactly make up for the gap between social costs and private costs on the
excessive care side of the line.115 But even under more realistic conditions
where precautions are lumpy and their effects nonlinear, it is likely to
outperform the other alternatives. Unlike in a pure HBN regime, a negligent
defendant is not allowed to partition her omissions into negligent and
nonnegligent components when a qualifying untaken precaution can be
identified that spans the two categories. But, unlike HWN, the UUP
approach does not generate an unlimited cliff of liability. The pedestrian
brained by a ball exiting the field at a height of sixty feet has no claim,
because a sixty-foot fence would not be worth its cost, even when
considered as a unit and compared with nothing at all.
Instead, as Grady’s elegant graphical representations of this point
demonstrate, a plaintiff’s ability to identify an untaken precaution that
exhibits both cost effectiveness and causal effectiveness depends crucially
on what the defendant has done and failed to do.116 Suppose that the cricket
club had constructed the optimal six-foot fence. In that case, there would
have been no way that a plaintiff could identify an untaken precaution that
would have been cost justified and also would have stopped the ball in
question. If incremental increases beyond six feet are not cost justified,
then it is immaterial that they would have stopped this accident. But when
the defendant fails to meet the standard of due care, the increment by which
she falls short effectively grants some added running room to the plaintiff to
identify a precaution that meets the doctrinal criteria. So by failing to
construct any fence at all, the cricket club (properly, in Grady’s view)
leaves itself open to the lumpy precaution that fits into the gap created by its
own shortfall.117
As a final demonstration of how this approach works, consider an actor
who constructs a five foot fence rather than the optimal six foot fence.
Suppose two pedestrians are brained by cricket balls in the same week; one
of these balls exited the field at a height of just under eight feet, as in the
original example, and the second one exited the field at a height of just over
six feet. Under Grady’s approach, the second plaintiff, but not the first
114
See Grady, supra note 25, at 671 (“The lower the defendant’s actual level of precaution, the more social
surplus that exists from moving up to the efficient level”).
115
The result is a symmetrical penalty on errors on either side of due care. See Grady, supra note 15, at
817-21 & figs. 4 and 5. The counterbalancing may not be perfect under real world conditions where nonlinearities
and lumpiness exist.
116
Id. at 815-16 (explaining that “as the injurer takes less precaution, he creates more opportunities for the
victim to show a breach of duty”); id. at 818-21 & figs 4 and 5; see also id. at 801-06 & fig. 1.
117
See id. at 815-16; Grady, supra note 25, at 671 (“Whenever a plaintiff is allowed to add a lump of untaken
precaution to the defendant’s suboptimal care level, he can show that marginal benefits exceed costs even when
the lump extends somewhat beyond due care.”).
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plaintiff, could make out a successful case. The first plaintiff would be
unable to show an untaken precaution that would have been cost justified
and also would have prevented this accident. Only an eight foot fence
would have stopped this accident, but increasing the fence height from five
feet to eight feet is not cost-justified on the figures given in Table 2. It
would cost $300 in construction costs but would only save society $275 in
accident costs.118 By building to five feet, the actor has shielded herself
from liability she would have faced on this approach had she built no fence
at all.
The second plaintiff, brained by a ball just over six feet in altitude,
would have more luck. Here, the cost of building the extra two feet ($200)
compares favorably with the accident cost savings associated with those
extra two feet ($225);119 considered as a unit, the extra two feet of fencing is
cost justified. It may seem harsh to hit the defendant with liability for an
accident that the optimal fence would not have stopped, but the defendant
opened herself up to this result by failing to build the optimal fence.
This approach is attractive, but it presents some conceptual and
doctrinal difficulties. As the examples above show, liability might result,
variously, from failing to build a six-foot, seven-foot, or even eight-foot
fence, depending on what kind of fence, if any, the defendant actually built.
Does this pattern mean that the due care standard floats about depending on
what the defendant has actually done or left undone? This is indeed what
Grady proposes.120 His understanding of his cost-benefit test hews to the
HBN philosophy but allows what counts as “negligence” to become more or
less demanding depending on the defendant’s actual inputs.
Disconcertingly, however, this requires us to accept an understanding of
due care that appears to eschew marginal analysis and demand (at times)
unjustified incremental investments in safety.
There is an alternative way to characterize this approach. We could see
it as leaving due care in a fixed position (here, the optimal six foot fence)
but adopting a looser and more instrumental understanding of the
relationship between failure to take due care and the imposition of liability.
The UUP approach generates a liability outcome for the ball that the eight
foot fence would have stopped, but not due to any belief that due care
requires an eight-foot fence, or that fences are only available in eight-foot
118
This figure is obtained by adding the marginal benefit for each of the one-foot increases ($175 + $75 +
$25 = $275).
119
This figure is obtained by adding the marginal benefit for the two one-foot increases ($175 + $75 =
$225).
120
See Grady, supra note 15, at 814 (explaining that his cost-benefit approach “retains the concept of legal
causation of the P*-cutoff rule, but defines breach of duty in a manner altogether different from the P*comparison approach”); id. at 815 (“[T]he cost-benefit approach permits alternative proofs of breach of duty, and
the levels of untaken precaution available for the victim’s proof increase as the injurer’s actual precaution
decreases.”).

30

Fennell

[31-Aug-17

increments. Instead, unifying the precaution and comparing it to what the
defendant actually did is merely a neat trick designed to make up for other
incentive misalignments produced by the negligence regime.121 On this
reading, the UUP is a sort of “harming while negligent plus” (HWNP) rule,
where the “plus” factor that produces liability is the plaintiff’s ability to
identify an untaken precaution that is both cost effective and causally
effective.122 As we will see, a conceptually similar HWNP approach can be
pursued in contexts where the failure to exercise due care produces factual
uncertainty about whether due care would have prevented the harm in
question.123
The UUP standard not only corrects for the distortive ledge effect built
into the negligence standard, but also economizes on information. To
determine liability, it is not necessary (nor especially useful, nor generally
even possible) to calculate the exact location of the due care line in the
abstract.124 Instead, a court can simply look at whether an untaken
precaution exists that would have stopped this accident and that is also cost
effective on the whole.125 Consistent with this point, we might understand
due care as a step good that, like a bridge, generates certain societal benefits
when (and only when) it is provided by defendants in full. These benefits,
which include reduced information costs, entitle nonnegligent defendants
to a safe harbor from liability for efficient accidents.126 Because defendants
who fall short need not be extended this same immunity, tort law is free to
121

See generally Grady, supra note 15.
The notion of “causally effective” that I have in mind here would include not just “but for” causation but
also standard notions of proximate cause that require that the accident stem from a type of risk that is increased by
the activity in question. The examples in the text easily satisfy this standard, so it is not in issue. However,
causation would fail on these independent grounds if, for example, a cost-effective reduction in speed would have
prevented the accident not because of its effects on accident risks but simply because it would have caused the
vehicle to be somewhere else when an exogenous risk (such as a tree randomly falling) produced harm by
coincidence. See Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch, 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899); see also Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks,
106 MICH. L. REV. 243, 249-50 (2007). Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability as Enterprise Liability, working
paper (Dec. 2016) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880705 (explaining that enterprise liability is limited
only to “’characteristic risks’ of activities”).
123
See infra Part III.
124
See Grady, supra note 25, at 660 (discussing the “excessive information” that courts would require to
implement an approach based on optimal precaution levels). A related problem is that there may exist no
precaution that perfectly aligns with the optimal level of precautionary expenditures, given that precautions are
often chunky in nature and must be supplied in particular quantities, if at all. Calculating the point where smooth
cost-benefit lines would hypothetically cross provides a technical answer that may have no real-world
counterpart—or one that might be too costly to uncover. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality
in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 328-32 (1996) (rejecting a “razor’s edge” interpretation of the Hand
formula that would determine negligence based on a penny’s difference in marginal costs and benefits.).
125
See Grady, supra note 25, at 661 (“This same untaken-precaution approach also reduces courts’ need for
technical information because they no longer have to identify the precautions that produce the global minimum of
social cost; they need only examine the costs and benefits of the precautions that the plaintiff has actually alleged
that the defendant failed to take.”).
126
A safe harbor tends to produce convergence at the point of safety—no one gains from going beyond what
is necessary, but no one wants to be left outside and exposed to liability, either. See Morse, supra note 64, at
1389-90 (noting this “two-way convergence”). That result depends, however, on perfect information about the
location of one’s conduct relative to the standard, or, if that information is lacking, symmetrically arrayed
consequences for overshooting and undershooting.
122
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shape their liability in the ways that best achieve its objectives. The UUP
approach appears to fit the bill, exposing negligent defendants to a limited
form of strict liability127 in order to align their incentives and reduce the
costs of adjudication.
This approach might seem vulnerable to another criticism, however: that
it invites strategic behavior by actors when precautions come in lumpy
increments. The next section takes up this point, which is not unique to the
UUP proposal but rather emerges whenever actor-selected preventative
measures enter into the liability assessment.
C. Strategic Slicing
Suppose the precautions available to an actor in a given context are not
continuous in nature like fence heights but instead involve binary or lumpy
choices about things like buying a new piece of safety equipment or adding
another employee.128 A focus on untaken precautions measured relative to a
defendant’s actual actions might seem to allow defendants to strategically
select precautions that fall short of due care, yet not enough short of due
care to leave room for a cost-effective and causally effective untaken
precaution, given the chunks in which precautions must be taken.129 There
are ways to address this concern, albeit imperfectly.
At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that this issue only arises in cases
where there is no clear external standard that defines due care, such as a
statutorily required piece of safety equipment. If a life preserver is required
on board, the fact that the plaintiff did something less, such as having a rope
on board, will not shield her from liability if the absence of the preserver
caused the harm, regardless of how the marginal analysis plays out between
rope and preserver or between preserver and doing nothing. The trickier
cases are ones in which the location of the due care standard must be
determined based on a Hand formula analysis. Here, a comparison of
different possible precautions may be likely to take center stage.
Imagine that a defendant faces the situation that was presented in the
127
The UUP approach imposes strict liability to the extent that the defendant may be held liable for some
accidents that due care would not, in fact, have prevented. It is, however, a limited form of strict liability that only
reaches the accidents that qualifying untaken precautions would have prevented.
128
Even the fence height examples above assumed a certain degree of lumpiness, insofar as non-integer
fences were ruled out. But it is easier to imagine far less divisible precautions.
129
To keep the analysis as simple as possible for purposes of isolating the implications of lumpiness, the
discussion here focuses on scenarios in which precautions are open only to one party, the potential injurer. There
are numerous other strategic possibilities that emerge from the interactions between precautionary choices made
by different parties—a topic that has been the subject of extensive scholarship. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Torts in
Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J.L. & ECON. 589 (1983); Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim
Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201 (2001); Dhammika Dharmapala and Sandy Hoffman, Bilateral Accidents with
Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 239 (2005); Ehud Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk
of Opportunistic Precautions, 93 VA. L. REV. 1389 (2007). The lumpiness and durability of precautions can play
important roles in these contexts as well.
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famous Carroll Towing case and must decide whether to hire a bargee who
could intervene in the event a boat breaks loose from its moorings.130
Suppose further that there are three possible precautions: hiring a daytime
bargee (Precaution A); hiring a night-shift bargee (Precaution B); and hiring
a full-time bargee who would live on the boat and be on call around the
clock (Precaution C). Imagine our defendant chooses Precaution A, the
daytime-only bargee, and the accident occurs after hours, when the bargee
is ashore. Precaution B, the night-shift bargee, or Precaution C, the full-time
bargee, would have stopped the accident from happening. Suppose further
that, starting from the baseline of a daytime-only bargee, the marginal
improvement associated with adding a night-shift bargee would not justify
the cost. Can a towing company that hires the daytime bargee immunize
itself against the claim that a full-time bargee would have been costjustified, based on the demonstration that adding a night-shift bargee would
not be cost-justified?
Not necessarily. Although this might at first look exactly like the case
where a cricket club has already built an optimal fence and no further
improvements would be efficient, there may be indivisibilities or economies
of scale associated with paying for a full-time bargee who will live on the
boat. Suppose the costs and benefits looked like the ones in Table 3.
Table 3: Bargee Precautions
A:
B:
C:
D:

Daytime Only
Nightshift Only
Full-time
A+B

Cost of Precaution
100
100
180
200

Expected Benefit
120
85
205
205

In this case, hiring one person to be on call around the clock is cheaper than
hiring two shift workers to split the work. This makes Precaution C, the
full-time bargee, the optimal precaution—even though it would be
inefficient to add Precaution B to existing Precaution A.
This example shows why it would be unworkable to use a defendant’s
actual conduct as the sole baseline from which to assess whether there was
an efficient untaken precaution that would have stopped the harm from
occurring. In any case involving indivisibilities or economies of scale, the
defendant could choose a partial measure like Precaution A and be shielded
130
This is a stylization of the actual facts. The towing company had hired a bargee, just not a very reliable
one. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173 (noting that the bargee had been absent from the barge without excuse
for about twenty-one hours); see also Grady, supra note 9, at 301 (noting that the slacking bargee is often viewed
as the functional equivalent “of not hiring a bargee in the first place (a fictional durable precaution that helps us
understand the case in terms of the theory)”).
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from liability by the unavailability or nonexistence of a Precaution B that,
when added to Precaution A, would meet the criteria of being both causally
effective and cost-effective. But this result is not a necessary implication of
the UUP approach described above. The untaken precaution sufficient to
establish the negligence liability of the defendant might be either a
precaution that could be added to the defendant’s actual efforts, or a
substitute precaution for the efforts that the defendant actually undertook—
but only if the upgrade is a cost-effective one.
Going back to the bargee precaution numbers in Table 3, we can see
that the defendant who has actually hired a daytime bargee will be able to
rebut any claim that she should have also hired a nightshift bargee. Doing
so would cost an extra 100 but save only 70 in accident costs. This is so
even though the total benefits of the two shifts together (Precaution D)
exceed their total costs. But the plaintiff can nonetheless show that the
defendant should have substituted a better precaution (full-time bargee) for
the precaution she took (daytime bargee).
The cost of substituting a full-time bargee for a daytime-only bargee is a
cost-justified one, and it would have stopped the accident in question.
Making the switch requires expending an extra 80 in precaution costs but
yields an extra 85 in expected benefits. Thus, a proper analysis will
compare what the plaintiff could have done with what the plaintiff actually
did to see if there is room for an improvement that would have mattered in
the case. The defendant who actually hired a bargee for the dayshift can
indeed shield herself from claims that she should have also hired a
nightshift worker, but not from claims that she should have undertaken a
different approach from the outset: hiring a full-time live-aboard worker.131
Lumpiness in precautions may make some kinds of strategizing easier,
however. David Gilo and Ehud Guttel focus on the possibility of
strategically low activity levels: if installing a particular kind of smokestack
becomes cost-justified only at a given production level, a factory might hold
production just below the break-even threshold in order to avoid having to
incur the cost of the smokestack.132 Here, the defendant is effectively
131
This conclusion is of course sensitive to the numbers used in the example. Suppose instead that a change
in labor laws causes the cost of a full-time worker to rise to 200, the same cost as purchasing the two shifts in
combination. Under the UUP approach, the barge owner who has actually retained a dayshift worker would be
shielded from liability because there would not be any marginal improvement that could be made in that case. See
The Kathryn B. Buinan, 176 F. 301 (2d Cir. 1910) (upholding a judgment that a night watchman was not required
in addition to the day-shift scow master, albeit on grounds of custom). On the other hand, the barge owner who
has not retained any bargee would be held liable for nighttime as well as daytime losses because a full-time bargee
(or the combination of dayshift and nightshift bargees) would, taken as a whole, be a cost-justified improvement
over what she actually did, which was nothing.
132
David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108
MICH. L. REV. 277, 280-81 (2009). Gilo and Guttel argue that their claims are not limited to lumpy precautions,
but their theory seems to fit best with such precautions, which also form their primary examples. See Mark
Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity Levels, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 30 (2009)
(contending that Gilo and Guttel’s theory depends upon lumpiness); David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Insufficient
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choosing one precaution—curtailing her activity level—in order to make
another precaution prohibitively expensive relative to its benefits when
added to that earlier precaution. But it is not as simple as in the bargee case
to say that the defendant should have replaced the precaution she selected
(suppressed activity) with a different one (smokestack) from the get-go.
Activity levels are generally not second-guessed at all in a negligence
regime, given the difficulty of a court determining whether a particular level
of activity was or was not worthwhile for the defendant.133 Saying that a
defendant should have done a given activity more seems both hard to prove
and at odds with usual notions of autonomy.134
Similar issues arise with decisions that are distributed over time. An
actor may sink costs into precautions that are optimal under current
conditions but that are destined to soon become suboptimal under
foreseeable new conditions. The fact that the precaution was optimal when
selected might be an effective rebuttal if tacking on an upgrade later would
not be cost-justified. Likewise, technological changes might make new
precautions superior to ones that were optimal when previously adopted but
the marginal improvement would not repay the retrofit.135 In these cases,
the costs of strategic behavior and the moral hazard of ignoring future
trends must be weighed against the advantages of encouraging people to
undertake precautions optimal for the conditions they presently confront.
That the law can always step in with regulatory solutions mitigates these
concerns to some degree by giving actors an incentive to guess correctly
about unfolding conditions.
Allowing defendants to capitalize on marginal analysis to dodge liability
when, and only when, they have actually taken the intermediate
precautionary step forecloses other sorts of opportunism. Consider the
Activity and Tort Liability: A Rejoinder, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 64, 65 (2009) (“[T]he cost of
precaution need not be ‘lumpy’ for the insufficient activity result to materialize.”).
133
Usually, this incapacity to effectively police activity levels translates into the concern that defendants will
select excessive activity levels. For example, a driver might make an unnecessary trip to a store for a frivolous
reason, when doing so carries trivial value for her compared to the risk that she generates for others even if she is
careful. See Shavell, supra note 42 at 25. Because courts are ill-positioned to determine whether a given trip was
valuable or valueless, see id., the driver gets the benefit of the negligence regime’s safe harbor regardless. The fact
that drivers may be unable to avoid occasional lapses from the standard of due care tends to buffer this effect,
however, see supra Part I, as does the widespread use of insurance that may be better able to meter and price
activity level risks.
134
See Kenneth S. Abraham, Response, Insufficient Analysis of Insufficient Activity, 108 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 26-28 (2009) (making these points). Of course, regulatory solutions can get at this issue
from a different direction, arguably with just as much interference with autonomy, although framed less
controversially. See id. at 26 (noting the importance of “optics”). For example, the government could simply
mandate a smokestack for widget production operations, and those operators who could not cover its costs at their
current production levels would be forced to either increase production or go out of business.
135
For example, suppose a defendant used a certain style of safety glass that was state of the art at the time
of its installation, T1. Later, at T2, an improved type of safety glass is invented that offers a better overall ratio of
benefits to costs. Choosing the original type of safety glass would amount to negligence if undertaken at T2. But
the cost of upgrading from the current type of glass would not be worth the marginal improvement that would be
derived from doing so, given the costs of retrofitting.
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famous case of Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel.136 Under applicable law, the
motel was required either to provide a lifeguard at its pool or to provide a
“lifeguard substitute”: a sign warning that no lifeguard was on duty.
Plaintiff’s decedents were a father and his young son who went into the
pool without knowing how to swim, and drowned. There was no lifeguard
present and no sign posted about the absence of a lifeguard. The defendants
prevailed at trial, but the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded
for a new trial, holding that once the defendant’s negligent noncompliance
was established, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the lack of a
lifeguard was not a proximate cause of the deaths.137
Although academic treatments disagree about which of the alternative
precautions (if either) constituted optimal care,138 one way of understanding
the case is illustrated by the numbers in Table 4.
Table 4: Swimming Pool Precautions
Sign Only
Lifeguard Only

Cost of Precaution
100
500

Expected Benefit
120
510

Assume that both the sign and lifeguard are lumpy on-off choices, and
that it is only sensible to do one or the other, not both.139 Even though both
precautions “pay for themselves” in that total benefits exceed total costs, the
sign is the optimal precaution on the numbers given. This can be
demonstrated by considering an “upgrade” from the sign to the lifeguard. It
would cost an extra 400 but would produce only an extra 390 in benefits.
Thus, a defendant who had posted the sign would have no difficulty
showing that it was not negligent to stop there—even if there were no
statute on the books to back up her choice. But a defendant who had not
taken either of the precautions would have no such defense. The plaintiff
could show that the lifeguard would have been a cost-justified precaution
compared to what the defendant actually did, since an “upgrade” from doing
nothing entails benefits of 510 and costs of only 500.
136

478 P.2d 465 (Cal.1970).
Id. at 470.
Compare Grady, supra note 15, at 822 (stating that the sign has “at least a plausible claim” to be the
optimal care level, especially given the cost of retaining a lifeguard during the off season, when the accident
occurred) with Wright, supra note 15, at 88 (suggesting that the lifeguard was viewed as the optimal precaution,
with the statute allowing the sign, if posted, to support an assumption of risk defense). See also Saul Levmore,
Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 705-10 (1990) (analyzing
Haft as presenting a problem of “recurring misses” and discussing alternative ways it might be addressed, treating
the failure to post the sign as the relevant failure).
139
Although it would be possible hire a part-time lifeguard and post the sign the balance of the time, the cost
of the sign would not diminish as a result, and the fixed costs of hiring the lifeguard might make a full time
position the only viable alternative.
137
138
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The rationale for this approach, and the strategic possibilities that it
avoids, become clearer if we imagine a variation on the Haft facts. Suppose
there were two equally cost-effective ways of meeting the due care
standard:140 providing a life buoy at poolside, and making life jackets
available for check-out at the motel desk. With respect to any particular
drowning, it might be clear that one precaution would have been causally
effective and the other would not have been. For example, the person who
drowned might have been an unaccompanied nonswimmer who would have
almost certainly worn an available life jacket (based on well-documented
past behavior) but who did not have anyone on hand to throw him a life
buoy.141 If the motel takes neither precaution and a motel guest drowns, the
motel should not be able to strategically specify which of the two
precautions it “would have” taken, had it not been negligent, so as to evade
a showing of causation. The potential for underdeterrence is clear if this
were permitted, even though the motel can meet the due care standard by
actually taking either of the precautions.
The Haft court’s reasoning, and its ultimate bottom line, afford more
than one possible interpretation. It is almost (but not entirely) certain that a
posted sign would not have prevented the drownings.142 It is also very
likely that a lifeguard on the scene could have saved the pair. If an HWN
rule applies, the difference is academic. But if the rule is HBN, one of two
difficulties must be confronted. Either one must find a way to get past the
slim odds that the sign would have saved the decedents (fudging causation),
or one must find a way to impose liability for the failure to provide a
lifeguard (fudging due care). Saul Levmore has focused on the former
alternative under the head of “recurring misses” since it is, after all,
conceivable that some rare individuals would be deterred by a sign from
going into an unattended swimming pool.143 But the second alternative fits
neatly into Grady’s analysis: liability attaches for falling far enough short of
due care to afford space for a cost-effective and causally-effective
alternative: the lifeguard.144
Perhaps it is not really necessary to choose between these two
alternatives in understanding Haft. One might instead return to the idea of a
“harming while negligent plus” regime, where the plus factor can either be
omission of a precaution that meets causation and efficiency criteria when
compared with the plaintiff’s conduct or the omission of the optimal
precaution under circumstances where it might have made a difference. The
140

I am indebted to Ariel Porat for raising this point.
Or, conversely, a victim with a history of eschewing life jackets might have benefited from a life buoy
due to the presence of a nonswimming companion.
142
See Levmore, supra note 138, at 705 (putting the odds at about ten percent).
143
Id. at 705-06.
144
See Grady, supra note 15, at 822-23.
141
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next Part delves further into this question of omitted precautions that might
have, but did not necessarily, cause harm. Here we see how another form of
aggregation—actually or conceptually repeating the interaction—sheds
light on the evaluation of risk.
III. REPEATING RISKS
The cricket fence example was atypical in that it permitted certainty
about whether a given accident would have been prevented by a fence of a
given height. In many scenarios, by contrast, we know only that a given
accident would have been prevented with some probability if the actor were
not negligent. To use one of Cooter and Porat’s examples, suppose that the
negligent heating of a vat used to make hot chocolate causes a valve to
crack and cause harm.145 But there is only some positive probability that the
crack and resulting harm were caused by the defendant’s negligence; the
valve would crack a certain amount of the time when heated
nonnegligently. What to do in that case? One possibility is to charge the
accident to the defendant when the defendant was negligent if (and only if)
it is more likely than not that the negligence caused the harm.
This is an answer, but it may not be a satisfying one if the same
accident-causing procedure will be negligently repeated over and over, with
the negligence causing and not causing accidents in stable and predictable
proportions.146 Figuring out what to do about such probabilistic cases
involves another form of evaluative aggregation, one that asks what is the
right set of accidents—or potential accidents—to hold in mind in assessing
liability.
A. Compounding and Offsetting
A standard move in the economic analysis of tort law is to create a kind
of conceptual population explosion to assess how a particular approach will
work when scaled up. Instead of looking just at the case at hand, where a
defendant’s negligence might have, but probably didn’t, cause the plaintiff’s
injury, one hauls in a huge set of replicating mirrors and imagines the same
scenario playing out again and again and again, hundreds or thousands of
times.147 Mass-producing the interaction between plaintiff and defendant
145

See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 20.
See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 858 (1984) (arguing that the preponderance of the evidence standard “is
neither a rational nor a just means of resolving the systemic causal indeterminacy presented by mass exposure
cases involving defendants whose tortious conduct has caused or will cause a statistically ascertainable increase in
the incidence of a particular disease.”).
147
In some cases, such as mass toxic exposure cases, this exercise of imagination is not necessary—the
interaction has already been mass-produced in reality. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 146
146
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generates large-number trials that make probabilistic risk more tractable.148
Doing so also helps to identify and highlight systemic effects that might go
unnoticed in a one-off case.
Consider how this operation plays out in the vat example introduced
above. If the probability that the defendant’s negligence was to blame for a
cracked vat is always, say, 40%, a more-likely-than-not standard will
produce the phenomenon Levmore has termed “recurring misses.”149 Out of
one hundred repetitions of the accident, forty will be caused by negligence,
but none will be charged to the defendant. This can produce an insufficient
degree of deterrence.150 The opposite problem, which we might call
“relentless hits,” occurs if the probability that negligence was to blame is
always, say, 60%.151 Here, the defendant is always charged with the
accident even though her negligence was not to blame in 40 of the 100
cases. This produces a cliff effect similar to the one discussed above, which
again puts increased pressure on reaching the due care standard.152
The cracked vat example goes to uncertainty about the causal role of
negligence, where it is clear that the defendant’s acts (hot chocolate making,
and associated vat-heating) caused the harm. Causal uncertainty can also
run to whether a particular defendant’s acts caused the plaintiff’s harm at
all. Whether causal uncertainty relates to the causal effect of the defendant’s
negligence specifically, or of the defendant’s acts more generally, a crucial
question is whether replicating interactions like the one in question will tend
to produce compounding or offsetting errors. As a first cut, we must
consider what is meant by “interactions like the one in question.”
Obviously, if the interaction before us involves a 40% probability of a
causal connection, repeating that exact same scenario hundreds of times will
compound the error and produce a 40% error rate, if we stick with a
preponderance of the evidence standard. So we cannot quite mean that.
The question, rather, is whether the scenario before us, with its
particular level of causal uncertainty, is representative of the kinds of cases
that we would expect to see replicated over time. Is there something about
the vat apparatus (such as a stable background failure rate of 60% when
heated properly) that will always make it 40% likely that negligently rapid
148

It also subtly changes the framing of the risk being produced. Where an individual interaction might
generate merely a risk of harm to a given individual, the replication of this interaction enough times produces the
certainty of harm to a roughly determinate number of (unspecified) individuals. As Barbara Fried has recently
argued, we cannot categorically equate such statistical risk creation with the creation of certain harm on a given
occasion (for to do so would rule out everything, no matter how low the risk, if it were repeated enough times),
nor can we simply ignore the risk in all cases, but rather must take into account the level of risk. Barbara Fried,
Facing Up To Risk,
Stanford Public Law Working Paper (Oct 2016) available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850587.
149
Levmore, supra note 138.
150
See id. at 706.
151
See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 20-22; see also Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121
YALE L.J. 82, 109-12 (2011).
152
See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 20-22.
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heating causes the vat to crack?153 Or, instead, should we expect that the
kinds of interactions that defendants and plaintiffs like the ones before us
will have over time will tend to occupy a broad spectrum of probabilities?
In many settings we might expect the errors introduced by a rote application
of the preponderance of the evidence standard to roughly offset, with the
40% cases that generate no liability counterbalanced by the 60% cases that
generate liability. We may accept some level of error in individual cases but
become alarmed when scaling up suggests a systematic pattern of either
recurring misses or relentless hits.
The significance of such systemic causal errors varies, depending on
whether we are talking about attribution errors that run to negligencecausation, or more broadly to act-causation. In the former case, relentless
hits merely amount to a pocket of strict liability, as will be discussed below,
and recurring misses are relatively unproblematic to reach without
introducing serious distortions. Systematic problems with act-causation,
although occurring in relatively few domains,154 present the more troubling
specter of holding defendants liable where their acts were not causative at
all, or, alternatively, letting defendants systematically off the hook when
they did cause a certain quantum of harm, on average. Various alternatives
have been tried or proposed to reach these issues, including prorating
damages to account for uncertainty or shifting the burden of proof.155
Unsurprisingly, none of these approaches is fully satisfactory. There is a
fundamental tension between the scaling up that is necessary to clearly see
(and potentially solve) these problems and the one-to-one pairing of wrongs
and remedies that animates tort law.
An especially compelling variation of this basic problem is illustrated
by Jonathan Cohen’s “paradox of the gatecrasher” in which 1,000 people
are seated in a rodeo arena but only 499 have paid the admission fee – and it
is impossible to tell which ones.156 Under a preponderance of the evidence
standard each person at the rodeo (and hence every person at the rodeo)
153
Levmore makes this point about the facts in Haft. Levmore, supra note 138, at 706 (“The background
statistics on such matters as drowning and the efficacy of lifeguards and signs are sufficiently stable to ensure that
the preponderance rule will systematically ‘miss’ ongoing instances of antisocial behavior that it should deter.”).
154
In some cases the uncertainty is due to a high background risk given by nature, which may be either
episodically high (person overboard on rough seas) or persistently high (persons being treated for late-stage
cancers). In other cases, it is clear that harm was caused by some defendant, but there is uncertainty about which
one (cases of market share liability or alternative liability).
155
See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 486-87 (Wash. 1983)
(Pearson, J., concurring) (detailing a damage prorating approach based on reduced chance of survival, drawing on
analysis in Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting
Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981)); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)
(shifting the burden of proof in an alternative liability scenario, where both defendants were negligent but only
one could have caused the harm). For a survey of possible approaches to recurring misses, see Levmore, supra
note 138.
156
L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 75 (1977). This problem has generated an
extensive academic literature. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 138, at 694-95 & n.6 (discussing this scenario and
citing prior literature on it).

40

Fennell

[31-Aug-17

could be ejected or sued for the admission fee, since it is more likely than
not in each case that the person is a gatecrasher rather than a paying
customer.157 Here, multiplication of uncertainty generates a manifestly
absurd level of injustice, yet it is no different in kind from that which can
and indeed must occur in the individual close case.158 The difference is that
the act of multiplication enables us to see a larger slice of the world and to
observe its systematic skew.
That still does not quite explain why what is tolerable in the single case
may be intolerable in the aggregate. An economic explanation would be
that as long as cases generally wash out over time, incentives will be in at
least rough alignment, and we can do no better than stick with the
preponderance of the evidence test.159 On this account, close cases are
tolerated on the assumption that there is no systematic skew overcharging or
undercharging defendants. When the curtain is pulled back to show that
such a skew exists (within some identifiable corner), it becomes plain that
our hope for mistakes to wash each other out is unfounded.
Yet why stop with this rodeo when setting the bounds for acceptable
error cancellation? Suppose there is another rodeo arena across town run by
the same inept promoters that is simultaneously seating 1000 persons, 501
of whom bought tickets, and 499 of whom are gatecrashers. Here, recovery
would be impossible against any of the rodeo-goers on a preponderance of
the evidence standard, even though nearly half are gatecrashers. The errors
cancel if we consider the rodeos together, but we hardly feel better. The
promoters recover the right amount, but not from the right people. Repeat
this pair of rodeos hundreds of times and gatecrashers find themselves
getting ejected regularly, but paying customers are ejected almost as often.
Perhaps what makes the aggregate case more viscerally problematic
than the individual case is simply that aggregation changes the unit of
analysis when we begin to examine mistakes. In an individual one-off, we
have someone who is (in the factfinder’s eyes) partly at fault and partly not;
a binary decision in either direction does not strike us as a severe
miscarriage of justice (in a civil case, anyway) if for no other reason than
we can do no better. Scaling up changes what was a probabilistic
157

See COHEN, supra note 156, at 75. Of course, a no liability result could be premised here on the
promoter’s contribution to the information shortfall – its failure to come up with an appropriate system of
ticketing or stamping hands to distinguish paying guests from gatecrashers. See Levmore, supra note 138, at 69495. The analysis in the text assumes that no such precautions were available, which might require positing some
additional facts such as excellent ticket counterfeiting by the gatecrashers or unexpectedly disappearing ink for
handstamps.
158
A possible response might be that facts tend to cluster in a relatively lumpy fashion, making hairline close
cases a rarity, with most fact patterns yielding answers far above or below the 50% mark. Cf. BOVIK, supra note
21, at 41 fig. 4 (providing image histograms used in thresholding to illustrate the difference between “[w]ellseparated modes” and “[p]oorly separated or indistinct modes” with respect to gray levels). However, the tried
cases may tend to cluster closer to the 50% mark, regardless of the overall distribution. See George Priest and
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
159
See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 138, at 693-98.
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assessment about an individual to a social judgment that is 100% wrong as
to an identifiable number of actual people (even if we can’t say which
ones). With an individual in a close case, we cannot be sure a mistake is
being made at all; we think anyway it is less likely than not. With a crowd,
we are certain that mistakes are being made, and being made at the wholeperson level for a number of identifiable individuals.
There is at least one setting, however, in which we can formulate a
relatively non-distortive approach to causal uncertainty: the case in which
act-causation is clear but the causal role of negligence is not. The next
section explains how understanding due care as a step good helps to resolve
the difficulties surrounding negligence-causation.
B. The Bridge of Due Care
Consider again the case of the negligently heated hot chocolate and the
cracked vat, where it is 40% likely that the negligence caused the crack and
resulting damage. If we take an HBN approach and apply preponderance of
the evidence, the negligent chocolatiers escape liability. And if we repeat
the experiment a hundred times, they would escape liability every time,
while their negligence would have without doubt caused 40 of the cases of
harm. It seems as if we must choose between letting them get away with
negligence repeatedly and adjusting the required causal relationship.
A “harming while negligent” (HWN) standard escapes these vexing
difficulties because it loosens the fixation on whether negligence caused a
particular harm and asks instead whether negligence was present and the act
caused the harm. It is worth reconsidering the doctrinal and normative
objections to this approach, to see whether they hold water. Here we might
again consider viewing the negligence rule not as defining the outer limits
of liability but rather as setting out a safe harbor for which a defendant can
qualify only if she fully meets the standard of due care. As suggested above,
this recasting would treat due care as a kind of lumpy or step good that must
be supplied in full in order to deliver its liability-containing benefits to the
actor.
One rationale for treating due care as a step good is that it has certain
public good characteristics that are realized only when it is supplied in full.
When an actor satisfies the due care standard, not only are the costs of
accidents (including prevention costs) minimized, society is saved the
trouble of having to figure out whether her shortfall (as opposed to her act
in general) was causally responsible when harm results. In short, the actor is
delivering an information-cost benefit to society by fully meeting the due
care standard.160 The reward for providing this benefit is that she will be
160

For a recent discussion of the role of information costs in tort law, see generally Jennifer Arlen, Economic
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immune from liability even though her acts in the world will continue to
generate accidents, albeit efficient ones. On this view, the law truncates an
actor’s liability once she meets the standard of due care not due to any
normative principle that people are entitled to freely externalize all harms
that due care would not prevent, but rather because she has qualified herself
for special treatment by supplying the valuable lumpy good of due care.
There are at least two drawbacks to this approach. First, it may be
difficult for actors to know when the due care standard has been met,
especially in cases where it does not correspond to any obvious
discontinuity in the world. Keeping a vat of chocolate below the boiling
point is one thing, but making sure that heating occurs at a certain speed or
with a certain frequency of monitoring is another.161 Second, and closely
related, it is nearly impossible for actors to avoid falling below due care
now and then, and such “compliance errors” or “lapses” can lead to large
amounts of liability.162 These problems exist under any negligence standard,
but they are sharpened under an HWN standard because a moment’s lapse
or a trivial miscalculation can expose an otherwise careful defendant to
unlimited liability for not just the harm that was caused by her shortfall but
also for all the harm she causes that could not have been prevented by due
care.
An intermediate position between HWN and HBN would assess liability
only when there is at least an appreciable chance that the defendant’s
negligence caused the harm in question. Where it is obvious that due care
would have done nothing to stop the harm from occurring, then recovery
would not be available. This fits well with the information cost account
above, because factfinding difficulties will tend to cluster around cases
where the defendant’s negligence could have plausibly caused or not caused
the accident, not the outlier freak accidents that due care could not have
done anything to prevent. Such an “appreciable chance” approach in cases
of causal uncertainty could be coupled with the unified untaken precaution
approach above to short circuit many factual difficulties and avoid the
distortions that the “zero liability at due care” ledge would otherwise
produce. And it may be quite close to the approach courts already take.
Consider the case of Maddocks v. Bennett, a 1969 Alaska Supreme
Court decision involving an allergic reaction to a beauty salon’s hair dye
treatment.163 The manufacturer’s instructions for the dye product specified
use of a patch test 24 hours in advance to screen for allergic reactions. The
Analysis of Tort Liability for an Imperfect World, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Francesco Parisi, ed.) (forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2843742.
161
See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 15, at 17-20 & figs. 1.1 and 1.2 (providing examples involving
“natural continuity” (a vat leak) and “natural discontinuity” (a boil that spoils the batch)).
162
See supra Part I.
163
456 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1969).
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patch test was omitted, and the plaintiff developed a severe reaction to the
product. She first began remarking symptoms of itching and fatigue about
29 hours after the dye treatment (although she also reported having felt
unwell or “funny” for much of that day).164 The symptoms subsequently
escalated: the plaintiff’s eyes swelled, her scalp itched and burned, and all
of her hair fell out. The defendant conceded that failure to perform the patch
test 24 hours in advance was negligent, but disputed that a properly
administered patch test would have revealed an allergic reaction in time to
stop the planned dye treatment.
The court held that the plaintiff bore the burden of “show[ing] the truth
of the following statement: if the patch test had been given, results would
have occurred within the 24 hour waiting period indicating an allergic
reaction.”165 However, it did not find the emergence of symptoms 29 hours
later dispositive, since had a patch test been given, it would have been on a
different and more sensitive area of skin, and there would have been active
monitoring for—as opposed to passive noticing of—any allergic reactions.
The court concluded that “[b]ecause a reasonable person could conclude
that more likely than not the test would have shown some indication of an
allergic reaction, appellee did establish cause in fact sufficiently to take the
case to the jury.”166 While this outcome nominally heeds both the allocation
of burden of proof to the plaintiff and the use of the more likely than not
standard for cause in fact, sending the case to the jury is very likely (given
hindsight bias, a clearly negligent defendant, and a clearly harmed plaintiff)
to yield a recovery, under circumstances where the patch test could have
made a difference.
Contrast this case with Peterson v. Nielsen, a 1959 Utah Supreme Court
decision involving a highway accident.167 In that case, the defendant was
clearly negligent for pulling out in front of the plaintiff as she traveled on an
arterial highway, and the only question was whether the plaintiff’s speed
(which was somewhat in excess of the legal limit) was a contributing factor
that would bar her recovery. The court answered this question in the
negative because it found that she could not have avoided the accident had
she been traveling at the legal speed: “In the instant case, any reasonable
analysis of the specific findings as to speeds and distances, and the facts
necessarily incident to them, will show that the plaintiff could not have
avoided the accident by exercising due care.”168 After carefully reviewing
the evidence on skidmarks and distances, the court concluded that “she
would have collided with him had she been traveling at the lawful speed, or
164

Id. at 461.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 461.
167
9 Utah 2d 302 (1959). See also Wright, supra note 15, at 86-87 (discussing this case).
168
9 Utah 2d at 304.
165
166
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even at a considerably lesser one.”169
What this pair of cases suggests is this: where an actor was negligent
and that negligence could have had no effect on the accident that occurred,
there will be no liability, but where it is an open question whether the
negligence could have mattered, that may be enough to get to the jury.
Ruling out instances where an actor’s negligence could have had no impact
softens the cliff effect of a pure HWN standard, without creating the
distortions and information cost issues of a pure HBN standard. Imposing
liability when the actor was negligent, caused harm, and the negligence
might have mattered thus constitutes another flavor of a “harming while
negligent plus” (HWNP) approach. Here, the plus factor is an epistemically
difficult to reach but factually plausible causal relationship between the
negligent increment of the actor’s conduct and the harm that resulted.
A discontinuity in liability remains under this approach, insofar as a
defendant can be liable for more than what her negligence actually (more
likely than not) caused. But this discontinuity is automatically softened in
another way: the closer one is to due care, the fewer one’s expected accident
costs will be, because the frequency and severity of accidents will in fact be
reduced as one approaches due care. Contrast this result with the cliff effect
that the law might construct in a criminal or regulatory context, where being
only one hairsbreadth over a given legal limit or one hairsbreadth beneath
the applicable standard could yield results that are just as severe as being
quite far over the line or below the standard. In tort, one is only held liable
when one both generates undue risk (by failing to reach the due care
standard) and actually causes harm. Thus, one gains an expected benefit by
coming nearer to due care than by remaining further from due care by virtue
of the effects one produces in the world.
These gains are only concretely experienced by those engaged in a great
deal of repeat play—or who have access to insurance that creates similar
results—because only through the law of large numbers will actual accident
costs come to approximate expected accident costs. For most people,
accidents are infrequent, lumpy events. The theoretical ability to reduce
accident costs through close-to-optimal care will be of little comfort to
someone who has the misfortune of having a minor miscalculation or
169
Id. at 306. Wright presents this case as a rebuttal of Grady’s claim that courts will impose liability when
a cost-effective and causally effective precaution has been identified, relative to what the actor actually did.
Wright, supra note 15, at 86-87. In fact, it does not appear that any such precaution was ever identified in the
case. No slower speed was named that would have stopped the accident, so there was not any analysis about
whether dropping to that speed would have had benefits in excess of costs when considered as a unit from the
baseline representing the driver’s actual speed. Even if this had been shown, however, the existence of a statutory
speed limit might well have afforded a safe harbor to the actor if it were clear that the harm would have occurred
even at that speed. This example shows why it matters whether we understand the UUP approach to be actually
shifting the due care line (a move that becomes unavailable when an external standard for due care exists) or
instead altering the causation requirement associated with a fixed due care line (which could be doctrinally
combined with a fixed due care standard such as a speed limit). See text accompanying notes 120-122, supra.
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momentary lapse generate catastrophic loss.170 But it must again be
emphasized that this potential result is already a feature of the tort system as
we know it, and would exist under even an HBN regime with very
demanding causation requirements.171 Addressing that larger issue brings
us full circle to the questions of aggregation that emerge in evaluating
conduct—the place we began in studying lapses.
C. Matching Up Accidents
I have deferred until now the most difficult type of causation problem,
the one that arises when it is unclear whether the defendant’s riskgenerating acts caused the harm at all. This question of act-causation
presents issues distinct from those raised above where it was certain that the
defendant’s acts caused the harm, and the only question was whether her
negligence did so. Act causation emerges as a problem where the
background risk given by nature or produced by the acts of other parties
make it difficult to attribute causal responsibility to the defendant.172
The conceptual exercise of repetition has interesting effects here. If the
defendant was actually negligent, and we imagine her doing an act over and
over again with harm (of a sort that her negligence would be expected to
cause) repeatedly occurring, we might surmise that she caused some of that
harm, even if we don’t know which specific harms are her doing. What we
want to ask is not whether each of the harms were more likely than not
caused by her (a question that will in some contexts give us a repeated
negative answer), but rather: which of these harms are most likely to be
hers? If we could see the full universe of possibly-caused harms, and we
also knew roughly the amount of harm the defendant was responsible for,
we could look for features that would tip us off as to which ones were more
likely than the others to have been the fault of this defendant.
We plainly have no such capacity, yet the ordinary preponderance of the
evidence standard can be understood in something like these terms. By
partitioning cases based on whether the harm was more likely than not
caused by the defendant (the usual focus of our attention), the standard also
automatically identifies which defendant-harm pairings are more likely than
other possible defendant-harm pairings. If we wish to maintain an accidentcentered system, then we need a thresholding algorithm that will charge a
defendant with the amount of harm that she (statistically-speaking) caused.
170
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (David G. Owen, ed., 1995).
171
See id. at 398-401 (describing a scenario in which a defendant’s negligence clearly caused the accident,
but nonetheless generates an amount of liability that seems disproportionate to the severity of the lapse).
172
These problems tend to cluster around drownings, toxic exposures, and medical misadventures—settings
where background risk is high, other potential blame-bearers are prevalent, or both. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra
note 146, at 856-58 (noting these problems in mass toxic exposure cases).
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This happens automatically under a preponderance of the evidence standard
when the strength of the causal connections between harms and injurers are
symmetrically arrayed around the centerpoint.
In settings where causation will always be less likely than not, yet the
defendant is plainly responsible for some of the harm, a different approach
is required. Proportionate liability seems like a logical response.173 But it
fits uneasily within an accident-centric system.174 What should we do, for
example, when it is absolutely clear that a particular defendant couldn’t
have caused this plaintiff’s harm? The relentless application of a
proportionate liability rule in this context means abandoning any semblance
of a causation requirement, but relaxing it risks distortions in the overall
system of deterrence.175 An alternative would attempt to deliver incentives
by finding the relatively best defendant-harm pairings.
Here, instead of tort law’s more likely than not inquiry, we might ask a
slightly different question: Is the strength of the causal connection between
the harm and the defendant in the case before the court stronger or weaker
than the average causal connection between defendants engaged in this
type of activity and harms of this type?176 Of course, the verbal formulation
could be adjusted to require a larger gap between the average causal
connection and the liability-generating one, if desired. The point is a basic
one: if we are trying to match up defendants who cause harm with the harm
that they cause, it is the relative strength of the causal connection, and not
its absolute strength, that should matter. This corresponds to the intuitive
inquiry of whether there will there be better opportunities than this one to
hold the defendant to account for her risk-generating behavior.177
173
Under this approach, damages are prorated to factor in a proportionate degree of causal uncertainty. For
example, if a doctor’s negligence was 20% likely to have caused the plaintiff’s death, the plaintiff’s estate would
recover 20% of the amount of damages that would normally be available in such a case. If repeated over time, the
doctor would ultimately be liable for amounts equaling 20% of the deaths, even though every plaintiff could
recover in part and no plaintiff could recover in full. A different way of characterizing proportionate liability is to
redefine the harm not as death but rather as a “loss of a chance” of survival—an approach that allows a court to
retain a preponderance of the evidence standard. See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 832 (Mass.
2008). But when the injury is defined in this way, conceptual consistency would seem to require opening the
courthouse doors to those who had suffered no tangible ill effects at all if a doctor’s negligence nonetheless made
their survival less likely—a move that seems seriously at odds with an accident-based system. I thank Bert Huang
for discussions on this point.
174
Proportionate liability is just one possible node along a spectrum of more aggregative approaches that
would shift the focus from the individual accident to the systemic effects of risk creation. For arguments in favor
of aggregative “public law” mass tort adjudication processes, see generally Rosenberg, supra note 146.
175
See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076-78 (N.Y. 1989) (considering and rejecting
exculpation in market share liability litigation).
176
This inquiry closely resembles one method of “adaptive thresholding” in image manipulation. See Fisher,
supra note 23 (illustrating how using “the mean of a 7×7 [pixel] neighborhood” as the local threshold generates
much better results than applying a global threshold where there is “a strong illumination gradient” in the image).
177
The question of whether there is a better scenario or better plaintiff is a common one in tort (and other)
law and can explain a variety of doctrines. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 138, at (discussing the problem of
“recurring misses” which assumes a dearth of opportunities to hold the defendant to account); Richard M. Re,
Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191 (2014) (discussing the advantages of a “most interested plaintiff” standing
rule over an “adequacy-based approach”).
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The answer to that question directs us to a type of bundling that is
implicit in the repetition exercise. Many kinds of precautions are “durable”
in that they cannot be readily tailored across situations and conditions.178
For example, the preventative measure of putting a life buoy on a boat
before it goes out to sea cannot be altered during the boat’s journey
depending on factors that might bear on its efficacy.179 The buoy on board
in calm, predator-free waters is bundled with the buoy on board in stormy
shark-infested waters.180 Failing to supply the buoy generates a real risk of
liability because its absence in the calm, predator-free waters is very likely
to make a difference, even if it is unlikely to matter in the state of the world
where the swells are high and sharks circle. The inability of the defendant to
choose precautions separately in the two states of the world helps to
preserve appropriate incentives.181 Many times the buoy would not have
mattered, but we are able to easily pick out the times when it was most
likely to have mattered by using a more likely than not standard.
But suppose that a boat only plies stormy, sharky waters while
perpetually carrying a crew of terrible swimmers.182 It is possible that
leaving off the life buoy in this case is not actually Hand formula negligent
at all, but let us suppose that the buoy is so inexpensive and so occasionally
effective that it is negligent not to include it. Now, we want to ask not
whether it is more likely than not that the missing buoy caused an overboard
sailor’s death, but rather whether this overboard sailor’s death was more
likely (or, perhaps, much more likely) to have been caused by the missing
life buoy than the typical such overboard sailor’s death occurring under the
conditions in which the boat regularly operates.
A more straightforward example is provided in medical contexts where
the background risk of death is high.183 Here too, we want to identify the
harms that were the most likely ones, among those occurring in this
specialized high-risk setting, to have been caused by a doctor’s error. That
might be done by lowering the liability threshold to something close to the
average causal connection between a doctor’s negligence and negative
medical outcomes. If a doctor’s negligence would, if repeated, cause death
in 20 cases out of 100, a court might ask whether in the case before it the
causal connection between negligence and harm exceeds (or, perhaps,
178
See Mark F. Grady, Marginal Causation and Injurer Shirking, 7 J. TORT L. 1, 16-20 (2014) (discussing
the significance of durability and divisibility in precautions).
179
See id. at 16-17 (using an example involving a life buoy and heterogeneity in swimming ability to make
this point).
180
Grady terms this a “victim-aggregating effect,” but a precaution need not actually aggregate among
different victims as long as it aggregates among variety of possible accident scenarios involving different amounts
of background risk and hence different degrees of precaution efficacy. See id. at 26.
181
See id. at 16-20.
182
Cf. id. at 19 (presenting a hypothetical in which a boat owner can strategically tailor the provision of a life
preserver to the swimming abilities of the boat’s crew).
183
See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
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significantly or greatly exceeds) the baseline causal connection of 20%.
We might worry that making doctrinal adjustments like this one will
deter people from entering fields that involve high background risk, such as
medical specialties where survival chances are chronically low.184 The
concern is compounded if we also think that these same fields involve a
high risk of lapses, relative to other fields. This is similar to the worry that
people will underutilize valuable technologies if they generate many
opportunities for human lapses, even if they increase overall safety or
survival chances.185 The answer to all these points is essentially the same:
we may wish to subsidize people who enter certain fields or use certain
technologies, to account for the overall beneficial effects of these choices on
social welfare.186 What we want to leave in place, however, are incentives
for people to take appropriate levels of care at the margin.
If we wish to deliver incentives through a tort liability system that
makes binary judgments at the accident level (an open question) we will at
times need to settle for a rough and functional understanding of causation.
Just as the thresholds for converting grayscale pixels to black and white
may need to be adjusted within portions of an image to compensate for the
effects of light and shadow,187 we may need to alter the relevant thresholds
for assigning liability under certain background conditions. Scaling up the
interactions can help us see how and why to make these adjustments.
IV. EXTENSIONS AND CONNECTIONS
The analysis above has demonstrated how aggregation choices, often
made without reflection or comment, can decisively shape tort liability and
incentives. Although the particulars vary, similar points can be made in
other areas of law. In this last Part, I briefly consider connections between
the aggregation puzzles examined here and some that arise in other
doctrinal areas. These other legal contexts offer useful points of comparison
and the potential for transferable lessons in both directions.
A. Setting the Viewfinder
The problems of evaluative aggregation examined here illustrate a deep
and important question that runs through all of law: how wide or narrow
should the evaluative viewfinder be? Sometimes widening the frame to
184

See Cooter & Porat, supra note 4, at 348-50;
See Grady, supra note 9, at 297 (giving the example of a dialysis machine, which reduced overall risk but
increased liability by transforming some of the preexisting natural risk into a form susceptible to compliance
errors, and that therefore gives rise to negligence liability).
186
See Shavell, supra note 42, at 36-37.
187
See Fisher, supra note 23.
185
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encompass a larger slice of behavior allows evidence to pile up in support
of a conclusion that could not be reached, or could not be reached to a
sufficient level of confidence, based on a narrower window of observation.
At other times, widening the frame enables other observations to dilute or
offset the ones initially isolated in the viewfinder. Conversely, a
constriction in the evaluative frame might remove either corroborating or
mitigating evidence from view, or do some of each.
The lapse analysis thus shares common ground with questions that arise
in other evaluative contexts: Is the observation before us typical or atypical,
and could widening the frame provide a definitive answer? The fact that law
often determines liability based on what amounts to a single draw from an
otherwise opaque urn raises questions about the feasibility and legitimacy
of basing decisions on more draws. A core conceptual problem, of course, is
whether it is appropriate in a given context to, effectively, “take character
evidence” in this manner.188
Indeed, to even speak of behavior as a draw from an urn implies that
human beings constitute the same “urn” over time, and that observations
that form a pattern are not independent of each other.189 As a legal
proposition, this is controversial. To the extent that liability is meant to
attach to a given act, and not to one’s overall urn-pattern, peering into the
urn may appear illegitimate, and plucking additional draws both beside the
(legal) point and potentially prejudicial.190 Yet in many contexts, people try
to do exactly that, and it is generally regarded as not only sensible but
essentially required. For example, it might seem rash to fail to obtain
references about a potential hire. Likewise, an employer who suspects an
employee of dishonesty might watch that employee closely to see if
corroborating or exonerating patterns appear.191 How we handle lapses in
tort law may bear on treatment of these other matters, and vice versa.
B. Bundling and Strategizing
In tort law, as we have seen, the capacity to treat untaken precautions as
indivisible bundles may be functional at times. This upends our usual
affinity for marginal analysis. By allowing the high value of omitted
efficient precautionary steps to absorb some of the wastefulness of omitted
188

See Grady, supra note 7, at 402.
This issue relates to larger philosophical questions about the durability of personal identity. See, e.g.,
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
190
For an interesting exploration of this issue in a criminal law context, see Sean Sullivan, Probative
Inference from Phenomenal Coincidence: Demystifying the Doctrine of Chances, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY AND
RISK 27 (2015) (examining the evidentiary use of similar incidents in an infamous case involving a defendant’s
alleged bathtub drowning of his wife, where his two prior wives had also drowned in the bathtub).
191
See Schauer & Zeckhauser, supra note 60, at 28 (contrasting the “discrete event” approach of criminal
law with employment decisions in which patterns of conduct are often deemed relevant).
189
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inefficient precautionary steps, the latter as well as the former can become a
basis for liability when the two appear together in a single proffered
untaken precaution. This may seem unconventional, until we recognize that
legislative line-drawing, logrolling, and deal-making of all sorts very
typically involve similar moves.
Elements that are inefficient or disadvantageous at the margin are
frequently allowed to cannibalize some of the surplus from the elements
that are worthwhile. The larger the excess of benefits over costs for the
worthwhile elements, the larger the flaws of the unworthwhile elements
may be without sinking the overall package. In making an up-down
assessment about a policy or program, total costs and total benefits are
typically compared—and because total benefits can exceed total costs well
beyond the stopping point indicated by marginal analysis, a plan that
appears valuable overall may include elements that erode, rather than
augment, its value.
Deference to legislative judgments suggests that courts will rarely
question the precise position of a line or ask whether it could have been
drawn in a different way to advance a greater amount of social value. Is this
desirable or undesirable? Recall that the rationale for unifying precautions
in the tort context turned on the otherwise asymmetric treatment of errors
falling above and below due care. In the legislative or administrative realm,
errors may involve doing too much or doing too little. If we think that
inaction or insufficient action is systematically punished less severely than
excessive action, then there may be an analogous reason to accept bundling
that embeds some inefficient increments.192 We have seen that the best
defense against the proffer of a unified untaken precaution is to take due
care in the first place, or as near to due care as one can get. Similarly,
moving legislation or regulation toward the optimal line offers protection
against bundled deals that will trade on the surplus of an untaken reform.193
Of course, the potential for strategic behavior also exists here. As new
regulations move the baseline forward, this may effectively constrain the
size of the next available change that would satisfy a cost-benefit analysis—
especially if the steps in which regulators must move are inherently chunky.
192

Of course, actions can move in a deregulatory direction as well as a regulatory one. See, e.g., Jonathan S.
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2915063.
193
If one wishes to make one’s own legislative or administrative agenda more durable, getting as close as
possible to optimality will help to immunize both against excessive moves in the same direction and against
repeals that move in the opposite direction. This is because there will be fewer moves in either direction that
would qualify as beneficial overall (to the extent that is required under cost-benefit analysis or otherwise).
Conversely, the more one legislature or administration overshoots optimality by tacking on worthless regulatory
elements that erode value, the more opportunities it provides for a later repeal that not only remove the worthless
elements but also some of the valuable ones as well—here, the gains from taking away worthless elements
produce surplus that can absorb some deficits produced by taking away valuable ones. Having courts directly
impose marginal analysis on both reforms and repeals could police excessive moves in both directions, see id., but
this would not address inaction.
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Thus, incremental moves might in some cases stymie rather than catalyze
further moves.194 By manipulating the unit of analysis—unifying or
subdividing moves—the space between optimality on an marginal analysis
and acceptability on a cost-benefit analysis can be exploited or eliminated.
C. Consequential Line-Crossings
Aggregation choices can determine whether a particular actor has
crossed a legal line. Such choices become more important the more clifflike are the consequences associated with line-crossing. Consider regulatory
takings law, where the government’s liability turns on whether it has, in the
words of Justice Holmes, gone “too far.”195 This inquiry depends, at least in
part, on how much of the owner’s property was taken.196 How should
property owner holdings be grouped together or broken apart in evaluating
whether the government has overreached in a manner requiring
compensation under the takings clause?197 And what should the
consequences be if the government has, indeed, gone too far?
The first question requires a multi-factor analysis, according to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Murr v. Wisconsin.198 The doctrinal
answer to the second question, however, is straightforward: once a taking is
found, the government must pay for all that it has taken, not just the “too
far” increment.199 This generates a formidable cliff effect.200 The approach
is analogous to an HWN rule in the tort realm, in that the causal link
between the “too farness” and the harm to the landowner need not be parsed
or the effects partitioned. While there have been calls to effectively
“continuize” the government’s payment requirement and impose liability
for all diminutions of value,201 there has been little pushback against the
194
Incremental changes also alter political coalitions in ways that increase the likelihood of future changes.
See generally Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 815
(2010). The fact that early reforms may be sliced in ways that alter the cost-benefit balance of future changes may
offer a counterweight to these effects.
195
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.
196
Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, if “all economically viable use” was eliminated by the
government action, then it will be a taking unless the government action merely carried out background principles
that were never part of the owner’s title to begin with. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Under the multi-factor Penn
Central test that applies in most situations, the question of how much was taken comes up in assessing the
economic impact on the owner and the degree of interference with the owner’s “distinct investment-backed
expectations.” Penn Central Transport. Co. v. New York City, 438 US 104 (1978).
197
This issue is familiar to property scholars as a “denominator problem” or an issue of “conceptual
severance.” See supra note 27 and accompanying text; infra notes 204-205. For further discussion of lumpiness as
it relates to regulatory takings, see Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1972-75 (2012).
198
Murr v. Wisconsin, slip op., 582 U.S. __ (2017).
199
Matters might appear complicated by the fact that the government can undo the regulation rather than pay
for the taking. However, the government is still liable for the time slice during which the regulation was in force.
First English. Prorating that slice is based only on time, not on how much of the regulatory impact went over the
“too far” line. To be sure, the government can then come back and enact something that does not go too far, and
pay nothing for that. But this is no different from its ability to have done so in the first instance.
200
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20 n.8.
201
These efforts in the takings realm are most prominently associated with the work of Richard Epstein. See,
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idea that the government is fully liable for the landowner’s loss once it
crosses the line to commit a regulatory taking.
If we accept a cliff effect in the takings context but resist it in the tort
context, it is perhaps because we are more conscious of ledge effects in the
former setting, and of their pernicious effects on incentives. Here, the
government enjoys a no-liability ledge right up until it has gone too far.
The argument would run like this: If the government pays nothing until it
goes too far, and then only pays for the too-far increment, it will err on the
side of “too far” every time, since it internalizes no benefit from going less
far (it pays zero, no matter how close to the “too far” line it may be, as long
as it does not go over).202 Of course, there are some questionable
assumptions built into this line of reasoning, including issues of
governmental responsiveness to payment obligations.203 But the core point
remains, and can explain the doctrine.
Alternatively, or in addition, perhaps there is a normative view that
when the government goes too far, this constitutes a unified, indivisible act
which cannot or at least should not be split into its component “not too far”
and “too far” pieces for settling up. The unified untaken precaution
approach embodies a similar judgment by treating a defendant’s negligent
omission and her nonnegligent omission as a unified liability-generating
event, at least when the two share space within a cost-justified untaken
precaution that would have prevented the accident. Considered side by side,
the two contexts suggest the need for more explicit thinking about when
certain legal or factual events will be treated as divisible or indivisible.
Regardless of its rationale, the cliff effect in regulatory takings analysis
generates great pressure around the “too far” line. This makes matters of
aggregation paramount. Thus courts and commentators struggle with “the
denominator problem”204 and its discredited alter ego, “conceptual
severance,”205 in attempting to define the property interest against which the
e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985). See also KATZ, supra note 1, at 145-51 (on efforts to “continuize”
different areas of law).
202
In fact, the evaluation of whether the government has gone too far depends on an amalgam of per se rules
and fuzzier standards—a combination that would seem to amount to a “sure shipwreck” configuration in Susan
Morse’s terminology. See Morse, supra note 64. But because of the relative rarity of takings liability outside of
the per se categories and the relative severity of burdens required to generate liability in cases involving the
application of standards, the situation is perhaps best understood as a creating a safe harbor in the “not too far”
space, even if the boundaries of that safe harbor are not perfectly crisp.
203
See, e.g., Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
204
The denominator problem takes its name from the implicit fraction-construction exercise that regulatory
takings doctrine invites when it asks how severely the owner’s property was burdened or whether “all
economically viable use” was taken. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 & n.7
(1992). To answer this question, we must define the base against which the diminution of value can be measured.
205
Margaret Jane Radin coined the term “conceptual severance” to denote an illegitimate form of
disaggregation that would define the property interest against which the government’s incursion was made in
terms of the regulatory incursion itself. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674-78 (1988). Conceptual severance has
been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 331 (rejecting
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government’s acts will be assessed. Widening the frame makes the
government action appear comparatively less burdensome, while tightening
it does the opposite, producing opportunities for strategic behavior on both
sides. Interesting questions abound, including what kinds of offsetting
effects on the landowner should “count” in pulling the government action
back from the “too far” brink.206 These questions, although seemingly far
removed from the aggregative issues that arise in the tort context, share
common structural features that merit attention.
CONCLUSION
Tort law’s focal point, the accident, is a discrete lump in a stream of
risk-related behavior. At the same time, it represents a single instantiation of
an interaction that may ultimately be repeated many times. The accident’s
scale and its singularity do not align especially well with the deterrence
tasks that tort law seeks to pursue through its impositions of liability. This
fact puts pressure on the aggregation choices that are implicated in the law’s
thresholding operations—the up-down judgments made at the accident
level, which cumulatively shape the overall pattern of tort law.
I have focused here on three sets of aggregative choices: the amount of
behavior to examine, the way that precautionary steps are stacked together,
and the conceptual replication of interactions in the analysis of risk. These
aggregation choices carry important implications for tort law that have not
been sufficiently recognized. Viewing these core theoretical puzzles of tort
law through the lens of evaluative aggregation offers new insights on
longstanding doctrinal questions as well as on emerging phenomena like
autonomous vehicles. The analysis here also sheds light on similar
aggregation issues that arise in other areas of law.

“[p]etitioners’ ‘conceptual severance’ argument” as inconsistent with the “parcel as a whole” analysis in Penn
Central). To rule out a circular definition of the property interest does not, however, tell us how the relevant
denominator should be defined. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS Ch. 7, § 7-7(b)(2), at 7-100 (5th ed.
2012) (suggesting an opposite risk of “conceptual agglomeration” in takings cases).
206
The transferrable development rights (TDRs) bestowed on the landmarked properties in the Penn Central
case offer an interesting example of this question. The majority and dissent disagreed over whether these TDRs
should enter the analysis in determining whether a taking had occurred (that is, whether they should be allowed to
offset the negative impact of landmarking on the landowners) or whether they should be disregarded in that
analysis and considered only as a form of compensation that should be assessed for its constitutional adequacy.
The controversy is an artifact of the cliff effect built into takings doctrine, which raises the possibility that a
governmental entity would try to pull back from the brink of a taking by offering something much less than full
compensation as an offset.

